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Nearly A Century in Reserve: Organized Baseball:
Collective Bargaining and the Antitrust
Exemption Enter the 80's
In her comment, the author fashions a compelling argument for congres-
sional elimination of baseball's exemption from federal antitrust laws. Af-
ter noting that the exemption had been formulated in 1922 by the
Supreme Court, the author explains that it has been abused by baseball
club owners to create a virtual monopoly over ballplayers through the re-
serve system. Although the reserve system's control was somewhat diluted
in 1976, with the advent offree agency and collective bargaining, club own-
ers are currently negotiating for mandatory compensation for the loss of
free agents. The resultant threat of a player's strike has served to focus at-
tention on the anomalous situation created by the antitrust exemption.
The comment's thorough analysis of the history of the reserve clause, vis-a-
vis the federal antitrust laws, and the ballplayers' continuing efforts to bar-
gain freely for their services, lays a formidable framework for the argu-
ment against the exemption.
"Oh, somewhere in this favored land the sun is shining bright,
The band is playing somewhere, and somewhere hearts are light;
And somewhere men are laughing, and somewhere children shout,
But there is no joy in Mudville-mighty Casey has struck out."
Ernest Lawrence Thayer
I. INTRODUCTION
Baseball in 1980 is again embroiled in bitter controversy. Club
owners longing for antediluvian days have launched an attack on
the Mudville nine, perhaps prompting some to book passage on
the next available ark.
Unfortunately, however, the dispute is not that humorous. It
once again involves the celebrated reserve clause,1 which in 1976
1. The reserve system prior to 1976 was not a singular "clause" at all. Rather,
its effect was drawn from provisions of the Basic Agreement, the Major League
Rules, Professional Baseball Rules and the Uniform Players Contract.
From the standpoint of a new player coming into the system as it existed until
1976, this is how the reserve system worked: each player seeking to enter base-
ball, whether initially or as a free agent, must go through a draft. See, e.g., MLR 4.
If selected by a club in a draft he may bargain only with that club. Id. If a new
players wishes not to play for that club he must wait until the next draft is held.
Id.
Each player is required to sign the Uniform Players Contract. It empowers the
signing club to unilaterally renew the contract from year to year should the player
and club fail to come to terms on a new agreement. There may be, however, no
gave rise to a new interpretation of free agency-the owners'
nemesis. Since the late 1800's baseball players have served liter-
ally under the thumb of their economic "owners" unable to en-
force laws2 of our country against their employers. This was the
rule until 1976 when, freed from a system of perpetual control,
ballplayers gained the power to bargain with club owners to es-
tablish the terms of a system of reserve.3
It must be noted at the outset that there is widespread agree-
ment that some sort of reserve system is necessary to the game of
baseball. There is only disagreement, albeit bitter, as to the de-
gree of control involved. League management and club owners
have suggested that the restrictions imposed by the reserve sys-
tem are reasonable and necessary to preserve the integrity of the
game, maintain balanced competition and fan interest, and en-
courage continued investment in player development. Whatever
the justification, the reserve system as it existed before 1976 de-
nied baseball players the freedom to choose their employer
throughout their tenure in baseball, in a denial of substantial fed-
eral rights granted all other laborers.4 Each team was and is al-
lowed to so control forty ballplayers, 5 in a total monopoly of the
nation's baseball talent.
Baseball's past is littered with unsuccessful challenges to the
reserve system. Most of the attacks were based upon the federal
more than a 20% pay cut from the preceding year. See MLR 3(a), UPC. Once
signed, the player is forbidden to negotiate for baseball employment with any
other club. See, e.g., MLR 3(g).
The signing club may assign a player's contract to any other club without per-
mission of, or consultation with, the player. See, e.g., MLR 9. The assignee club
enjoys all rights of the assignor club. See, e.g., MLR 9. The club holding rights to
the player retains the exclusive right to negotiate with the player should he refuse
to sign or play. See, e.g., MLR 15.
Before a player can be unconditionally released and his contract terminated he
must be placed on waivers which renders his contract available to every other Ma-
jor League Club. See UPC, MLR 8.
Thus, until 1976, players' careers were under the complete management and con-
trol of the signing club. During the entire course of a player's employment in pro-
fessional baseball there was no alternative to these control mechanisms. Then, in
the 1976 Basic Agreement, the reserve system was enumerated with monumental
changes. See the text of the 1976 reserve system included in Appendix infra.
2. The laws referred to here are the federal antitrust laws. The Sherman Act,
15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976), The Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-15, 19-22, 27, 44 (1976), and
29 U.S.C. § 52, 53 (1976).
3. Basic Agreement between the American League of Professional Baseball
Clubs and the National League of Professional Baseball Clubs and the Major
League Baseball Players Association. Effective January 1, 1976, see Article XVII
Appendix infra.
4. See note 2 supra.
5. This includes a maximum of 25 actives on its major league roster and 15
minor league ballplayers. In turn, the minor league teams may reserve any play-
ers not reserved by the major league team.
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antitrust laws.6 But successful challenge to the reserve system 7
was not to be had through the courts. Players lacked the collec-
tive strength to exert any influence on their conditions prior to
the mid-1960's. Thus, a history of unbridled monopoly has charac-
terized the growth of an industry which controlled the lives of
thousands of skilled laborers, "providing for their purchase, sale,
exchange, draft, reduction, discharge, and blacklisting"8 in a sys-
tem that seemed to establish a "species of quasi-peonage." 9 The
advent of collective bargaining in baseball and the formation of a
players association was viewed as the means by which almost 100
years of unrestricted reserve system control exercised over the
nation's baseball players would be ended. Finally in 1976, restric-
tions were placed on the reserve system as negotiated at the bar-
gaining table.
But in 1980, a crisis is imminent which may threaten the very
existence of baseball. For the first time in history, the club own-
6. Interestingly, the two initial challenges to baseball's reserve system de-
nied the employer club the right to enjoin defendant athletes from playing for a
club in the newly formed Players League. In Metropolitan Exhibition Club v. Ew-
ing, 42 F. 198 (S.D.N.Y. 1890), and Metropolitan Exhibition Club v. Ward, 9 N.Y.S.
779 (1890), the New York club of the National League filed suit against two of its
players designated as "reserve," who sought to play for a newly created league for
the season. Both courts denied an injunction, but for very different reasons. The
Ewing court found that the reserve clause pertained only to parties to the Na-
tional Agreement and would not be a basis to support an injunction to prevent
Ewing from playing in a non-signatory league. The Ward court did not support
this theory, yet found such ambiguity, uncertainty, and lack of mutuality in the
contract that they refused to issue the plaintiff's injunction. Needless to say, the
leagues promptly plugged the holes left in the systems and prevailed thereafter.
7. The initial reserve system was actually adopted in 1879, by secret agree-
ment of the National League club owners led by A.G. Mills, then president of the
National League. The agreement was only reduced to written pact status because
of the 1881 creation of the American Association which culminated in the National
Agreement between the two leagues respecting the reserve system. Even at that
point the player contracts made no mention of the reserve rules, save for an incor-
poration by reference of the National Agreement. Not until 1887, and only at the
behest of player representatives, was wording finally included in player contracts
outlining a reserve system. See L. SOBEI., PROFESSIONAL SPORTS AND THE LAW, 83-
86 (1977) citing H.R. REP. No. 2002, 82nd Cong., 2d Sess. 34 (1952). See also Metro-
politan Exhibition Co. v. Ewing, 42 F. 198, 202-04 (S.D.N.Y. 1890).
8. American League Baseball Club of Chicago v. Chase, 86 Misc. 441, 149
N.Y.S. 6, 17 (1914).
9. Id. More than one judicial and legislative opinion has expressed the
thought that the reserve system violated not only moral principles, but also estab-
lished in fact a form of peonage in violation of the thirteenth amendment to the
Constitution. See Gardella v. Chandler, 172 F.2d 402, 409-10 (2d Cir. 1949); Hearings
on S. 2373 before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1971) (statement of Senator Sam Erwin).
ers are challenging the reserve system. The loss of total owner
control over player mobility in the 1976 negotiations has resulted
in the vow to ruin free agency in 1980.10 The players association
was left with a take-it-or-leave-it proposal in a bitter breakdown of
collective bargaining this past spring.
Player challenges to owner control have not been very success-
ful in all but the recent past. Only through an examination of this
past may a solution be fashioned to cope with the situation as it
exists today. The following represents a brief history of judicial
doctrines, based upon antitrust principles, in response to chal-
lenges to owner control; the standards for antitrust liability; the
collective bargaining process as it operates in professional base-
ball; and the spectre of an impending strike, its basis and avenues
for reconciliation of the turmoil ahead.
II. JUDICIAL DOCTRINE: BASEBALL'S ANTITRUST EXEMPTION AND
THE RESERVE CLAUSE
Organized baseball was in its infancy when, pursuant to the
Commerce Clause," Congress passed the Sherman Act12 in 1890.
The Act was in response to the racing expansion of new indus-
tries, and was designed to break up monopoly powers and combi-
nations operating in restraint of trade among the states. Antitrust
fervor was fueled by the national spirit that free competition was
the healthiest and most efficient way to regulate economic activity
in the marketplace, and that demand should determine the price
and quantity of goods and services available to the public. The
Act had no impact upon baseball during this period, however, for
it was initially felt that antitrust laws were best applied to more
highly developed industries.'3
Throughout the period of baseball's chaotic formative years,14
10. The owners are not publicly advocating the ruination of free agency. But
in effect the compensation proposal, if enacted, will do just that. See text follow-
ing note 160 infra.
11. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
12. Congress also passed the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-15, 19-22, 27, 44; and
29 U.S.C. §§ 52, 53, in 1914 to provide a treble damage remedy and injunctive relief
for Sherman Act violations. In part, the Sherman Act provides:
§ 1 Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or con-
spiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States ... is
declared to be illegal.
§2 Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or
combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any
part of the trade or commerce among the several States ... shall be
deemed guilty of a misdemeanor.
15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1976).
13. Comment, Baseball's Antitrust Exemption and the Reserve System: Reap-
praisal of An Anachronism, 12 WM. & MARY L. REv. 859, 860 (1971).
14. Turbulent wars for player services rendered less wealthy clubs in small
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baseball management developed massive control over all aspects
of the sport. The Sherman Act and corresponding doctrines grew
with baseball, but the Act's steady maturation never caught up
with the more elusive moves of baseball. The result became the
relic that rests with baseball today, the antitrust exemption.
A. The Birth and Growth of the Exemption
1. Federal Baseball
In 1922, the Supreme Court of the United States deemed orga-
nized baseball exempt from federal antitrust laws in Federal
Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc., v. National League of Profes-
sional Baseball Clubs.15 In Federal Baseball, an independent
league of eight baseball clubs, desiring to become a major league,
reached a settlement with the National and American Leagues ef-
fectively absorbing the independent Federal League. All parties
were signatories to the agreement except the Baltimore club. The
Baltimore club subsequently brought suit for treble damages
against the National and American Leagues and others alleging
that the agreement violated the Sherman Act.16 The club ob-
market areas on the verge of financial disaster. Consistently unsuccessful teams
found themselves in stadiums devoid of spectators. From 1871-1875 16 of the 25
league clubs were financial failures. In 1876 the National League was formed with
eight surviving clubs and, although the membership increased to 15 in the ensuing
years, over half of these teams were eliminated by financial dissolution by 1879.
Illustrative of the devastation faced by baseball in its early years is the fact that
the 1869 Cincinnati Red Stockings played 57 games without a loss, the 1875 Boston
Red Stockings won 71 games and had 8 losses, and the 1875 Brooklyn Atlantics
won 2 games and had 42 losses. Professional baseball's response was the creation
of the reserve rules and corresponding control mechanisms. See generally Com-
ment, Monopsony in Manpower: Organized Baseball Meets the Antitrust Laws, 62
YALE LJ. 576, 586 (1953) (citing H.R. REP. No. 2002, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 17-22
(1952)).
15. 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
16. The claim asserted that the player contracts executed by the National and
American Leagues violated §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act entitling the Baltimore
club treble damages pursuant to § 4 of the Clayton Act. See note 12 supra. The
Clayton Act, provides the remedy:
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of
anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district
court of the United States in the district in which the defendant resides or
is found or has an agent, without respect to the amount in controversy,
and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of
suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976).
The suit alleged: (1) that the reserve clauses were restraints of trade as they
prohibited the Federal League from hiring quality players which resulted in the
tained a verdict in the trial court, but the court of appeals re-
versed17 in a decision affirmed by the Supreme Court.
In the unanimous decision by the Supreme Court, Mr. Justice
Holmes delivered the opinion which was to have unequalled im-
pact upon the development of professional baseball. Importantly,
the Court held that exhibitions of baseball were purely state af-
fairs; that the interstate transportation of players was merely inci-
dental; and that the exhibitions were not trade or commerce in
the ordinarily accepted use of the words.18 Since organized base-
ball was not involved in interstate commerce, it was therefore
outside of the scope of federal antitrust laws, which precluded
consideration of the merits of the case.
The ensuing years left baseball management to its own devices,
expanding at an increasingly fast pace and clear, for the most
part, of judicial restraint.19 At the same time, however, the con-
cept of interstate commerce had been vastly enlarged. Following
this it seemed as if the underlying rationale of Federal Baseball
should crumble, thereby bringing the business of organized base-
ball within interstate commerce and thus within the purview of
federal antitrust regulation. In fact, in a 1949 challenge to the re-
serve system, Gardella v. Chandler;20 Judges Learned Hand and
Jerome Frank agreed that in view of the expanded concept of in-
terstate commerce and the growth of organized baseball, the anti-
trust immunity conferred by Federal Baseball was perhaps no
longer valid.2 1 The case never came to the Supreme Court for re-
demise of the league; and (2) that the payoff to dissolve the Federal League cou-
pled with the exclusive perpetual rights to ballplayers in the American and Na-
tional League constituted an illegal monopoly of the trade and commerce in the
business of baseball in the United States.
17. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs v. Federal Baseball Club
of Baltimore, Inc., 269 F. 681 (D.C. Cir. 1920).
18. 259 U.S. at 208-09.
19. These years found the hegemony of the National and American Leagues
spreading quickly to engulf all professional baseball within the snare of their re-
serve rules, eliciting agreements to respect these from the professional leagues of
Panama, Puerto Rico, Mexico, Cuba, Venezuela, and Quebec, Canada. Baseball's
expansion also included, but was not limited to, vast changes in the broadcasting
area, minor league affiliates, league franchise expansion and transfer, involvement
in stadium operation, and concessions and employee relations.
20. 172 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1949). Gardella involved a ballplayer under contract
with the New York Giants who found himself blacklisted by the major leagues af-
ter he had played on a team in the Mexican League. His reserve rule challenge
was based upon the charge that the rule constituted an unreasonable restraint of
trade prohibited by the Sherman Act.
21. Id. In Gardella, the antitrust challenge to the reserve clause was dis-
missed by the district court based on the Federal Baseball precedent, but the sec-
ond circuit court of appeals held that remand must be had to determine further
issues that could make Federal Baseball obsolete. The court also held that Fed-
eral Baseball did not preclude such review, with Judge Frank supporting the re-
mand, stating:
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view, however, because of a subsequent out of court settlement,
thereby eliminating any direct impact that the views of Judges
Frank and Hand may have had upon the Federal Baseball ration-
ale. Other antitrust attacks upon baseball during this period were
unsuccessful, for the most part, as courts relied upon Federal
Baseball in precluding the challenges. 22
Baseball decisional law had sanctioned management to solely
control the development of the leagues for thirty-one years after
Federal Baseball, until another antitrust attack on it made its
way to the Supreme Court in 1953.
2. Toolson
In Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc. and companion cases, 23
several baseball players challenged the reserve system alleging
damage by the unlawful control of their freedom to participate as
players. In a per curiam decision 24 the Court, without examining
the underlying issues, affirmed the lower courts dismissal in reli-
ance upon Federal Baseball "so far as that decision holds that
Congress had no intention of including the business of baseball
within the scope of the antitrust laws."2 5 Although the Court sug-
gested that it might not have reached the same conclusion in 1922
as the Federal Baseball Court had in that year, it felt that be-
cause the business of organized baseball had been left to develop
This court cannot, of course tell the Supreme Court that it was once
wrong. But 'one should not wait for formal retraction in the face of
changes plainly foreshadowed;' this court's duty is 'to divine, as best it
can, what would be the event of the appeal in the case before it.' L. Hand,
C. J., dissenting in Spector Motor Service Co. v. Walsh, 139 F.2d 809, 823
(2d Cir. 1944).
172 F.2d at 409 n.1.
22. See, e.g., Corbett v. Chandler, 202 F.2d 428 (6th Cir. 1953); Kowalski v.
Chandler, 202 F.2d 413 (6th Cir. 1953); Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 101 F.
Supp. 93 (S.D. Cal. 1951), affd 200 F.2d. 198 (9th Cir. 1952); Martin v. National
League Baseball Club, 174 F.2d 917 (2d Cir. 1949); Niemiec v. Seattle Rainier Base-
ball Club, Inc., 67 F. Supp. 705 (W.D. Wash. 1946).
23. Toolson v. New York Yankees, 346 U.S. 356 (1953) (affirming Toolson v.
New York Yankees, Inc., 101 F. Supp. 93 (S.D. Cal. 1951)); Toolson v. New York
Yankees, Inc., 200 F.2d 198 (9th Cir. 1952); Corbett v. Chandler, 202 F.2d 428 (6th
Cir. 1953); Kowalski v. Chandler, 212 F.2d 413 (6th Cir. 1953).
24. Unlike Federal Baseball, the Toolson decision was not an unanimous one.
Dissenting Justices Burton and Reed placed importance on the particular facts in-
volved in the case, the expanding interstate involvement in baseball, and the ab-
sence of an express congressional exemption of organized baseball from the
Sherman Act. 346 U.S. at 357.
25. Id.
on its own for over thirty years on the understanding that it was
exempt from antitrust laws, any change must be left to Congress,
where subsequent legislation will have only prospective effect.26
The Court seemed to be particularly sensitive to the fact that for
three decades Congress had been aware of the ruling in Federal
Baseball, the subsequent challenges in lower courts, as well as
congressional studies, and had never seen fit to legislate on the
subject.27 A tacit approval was thusly inferred.28
The Toolson decision eliminated any future challenges to the
Federal Baseball rationale based upon the contention that orga-
nized baseball was, in fact, involved in interstate commerce and,
therefore, subject to federal antitrust regulation for the courts re-
liance on Federal Baseball did not rest on any presumed absence
of interstate commerce. The curious absence of the interstate
commerce issue in the Toolson opinion was characterized, and
perhaps excused, by two subsequent cases. In United States v. In-
ternational Boxing Club, the Court refused to acknowledge that
Toolson had also affirmed the interstate commerce issue, sug-
gesting that the Toolson Court "neither overruled Federal Base-
ball nor necessarily reaffirmed all that was said in Federal
Baseball.'"29 International Boxing, an antitrust action against
promoters of professional boxing contests, did not adhere to stare
decisis; rather, it expressly distinguished different sports activi-
ties and eliminated a blanket sports exemption from antitrust.
The companion case to International Boxing was United States v.
Shubert.30 In Shubert, the Supreme Court felt that the Toolson
opinion, while appropriate to baseball, was but a narrow applica-
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. The opinion stated:
In Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore v. National League of the Profes-
sional Baseball Clubs... this Court held that the business of providing
public baseball games for profit between clubs of professional baseball
players was not within the scope of the federal antitrust laws. Congress
has had the ruling under consideration but has not seen fit to bring such
business under these laws by legislation having prospective effect. The
business has thus been left for thirty years to develop, on the understand-
ing that it was not subject to existing antitrust legislation. The present
cases ask us to overrule the prior decision and, with retrospective effect,
hold the legislation applicable. We think that if there are evils in this field
which now warrant application to it of the antitrust laws it should be by
legislation. Without re-examination of the underlying issues, the judg-
ments below are affirmed on the authority of Federal Baseball Club of
Baltimore v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs... so far as
that decision determines that Congress had no intention of including the
business of baseball within the scope of the federal antitrust laws.
Id. at 356-57 (citations omitted). An excellent critique of the Supreme Court deci-
sion may be found in L. SOBEL, PROFESSIONAL SPORTS AND THE LAw, 28-29 (1977).
29. United States v. International Boxing Club, 348 U.S. 236, 242 (1955).
30. 348 U.S. 222 (1955). In Shubert, the Court, applying the Sherman Act to
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tion of Federal Baseball under the rule of stare decisis3 ' and
would not be applied to exempt the ambit of legitimate theatre
from the antitrust laws. The susceptibility of baseball to an anti-
trust challenge was effectively quashed. Subsequent cases in
lower courts acquiesced to the baseball exemption in light of the
Supreme Court's position.
B. The Creation of the Anomaly
Aggrieved parties were hammerlocked by ensuing events.
Radovich v. National Football League,32 a 1957 civil action
brought under the Clayton Act, challenged the application of the
antitrust exemption to professional football. Although the district
court dismissed and the ninth circuit affirmed in reliance upon
Federal Baseball and Toolson, the Supreme Court, in an anoma-
lous move, reversed the lower courts' ruling. The result was that
the Sherman Act was applicable to professional football.3 3 The
opinion in the Radovich case, while seeming to effectively erode
the principles behind Federal Baseball and Toolson, only served
to further frustrate baseball plaintiffs. Instead of reaffirming Fed-
eral Baseball and Toolson on solid and well reasoned legal princi-
ples, the Court felt that even admitting its dubious validity, the
repercussions of overruling precedent precluded it from cor-
recting its past errors.3 4 The opinion left the "clean up" job to
Congress, and the exemption was not extended to football with
the Court specifically limiting the exemption to the business of
the production and presentation of legitimate theatrical attractions, explained and
further distinguished Toolson.
31. 348 U.S. at 230.
32. 352 U.S. 445 (1957).
33. Id. at 450-52.
34. Id. The opinion by Justice Clark not only admits that the rationale of Fed-
eral Baseball and Toolson is of dubious validity, it suggests that the distinctions
drawn may be unrealistic, inconsistent, and illogical; words generally used by crit-
ics of judicial positions, not by the authors themselves. Such hearty support for
their judicial wisdom does not vindicate the fact that they default in the face of
tacitly admitted injustice, in the eyes of those preyed upon by baseball's monop-
oly.
The Court perhaps should have been made aware of the comment of one of its
own eminent jurists on the issue of precedent in a Harvard Law Review article:
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was
laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds
upon which it was laid down have vanished long since, and the rule sim-
ply persists from blind imitation of the past.
Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897).
organized baseball. 35
The lower courts acquiesed to the baseball exemption in light of
the Supreme Court's position.36 In 1970, a second circuit decision
in Salerno v. American League of Professional Baseball Clubs37
declined to overrule Federal Baseball and Toolson, reserving to
the Supreme Court the exclusive privilege of overruling its own
decision. While the second circuit also suggested that the ration-
ales of those cases were dubious at best,38 the court felt they were
also obliged to continue to apply the prevailing rule. The judici-
ary once again diminished the likelihood of success in a lower
court challenge to the baseball exemption.
It would seem that as of 1970, the courts evinced enough inten-
tion not to disturb the holdings of Federal Baseball and Toolson.
Coupled with the policy reasoning of the Supreme Court that
change in the antitrust exemption enjoyed by baseball alone
would have to be effected by legislation with prospective impact
only, judicial avenues were shut down, leaving only congressional
appeal as the last hurrah.39 Yet, the most celebrated judicial chal-
35. 352 U.S. 445 (1957). Football was not the only professional sport brought
under the purview of antitrust laws. In Haywood v. National Basketball Ass'n, 401
U.S. 1204 (1971), Mr. Justice Douglas reinstated a district court's injunction
pendente lite in favor of a professional basketball player, stating "[b ]asketball...
does not enjoy exemption from the antitrust laws." Id. at 1205. Thus the baseball
exemption is further splintered from the uniform coverage of other sports. See
also note 29 supra.
36. See, e.g., Portland Baseball Club, Inc. v. Baltimore Baseball Club, Inc., 282
F.2d 680 (9th Cir. 1960); State v. Milwaukee Braves, Inc., 31 Wis. 2d 699, 144 N.W.2d
1, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 990 (1966).
37. 429 F.2d 1003 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, Salerno v. Kuhn, 400 U.S. 1001
(1971) (suit brought by two discharged umpires who claimed that their discharge
was caused by their endeavor to organize American League umpires for collective
bargaining). It might be noted that the plaintiffs in Salerno as umpires were not
subject to the provisions of a players reserve clause. Certiorari was thus not in-
feredly denied on the reluctance of the Court to reconsider previous kinds of chal-
lenges, because the umpires, it was stated, had "exceedingly difficult obstacles" to
overcome in addition to Federal Baseball and Toolson. 429 F.2d at 1005.
38. 429 F.2d at 1005. The court, in refusing to depart from the Toolson holding,
supported its view in a qualified manner, stating:
We freely acknowledge our belief that Federal Baseball was not one of
Mr. Justice Holmes' happiest days, that the rationale of Toolson is ex-
tremely dubious and that, to use the Supreme Court's own adjectives, the
distinction between baseball and other professional sports is 'unrealistic,'
'inconsistent' and 'illogical' . . . . However, we continue to believe that
the Supreme Court should retain the exclusive privilege of overruling its
own decisions, save perhaps when opinions already delivered have cre-
ated a near certainty that only the occasion is needed for pronouncement
of the doom. While we should not fall out of our chairs with surprise at
the news that Federal Baseball and Toolson had been overruled, we are
not at all certain the Court is ready to give them a happy dispatch.
Id. (citations omitted).
39. Note, however, that the federal exemption discussed herein is effective
only to cover activities incidental to the maintenance of league structure. Al-
though this could arguably cover the bulk of management dealing and certainly
[Vol. 8: 313, 1981] Nearly A Century in Reserve
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
lenge to baseball's reserve clause was not to come to the courts
until January of 1970.
C. Flood and the Reserve Clause-Rigormortis in the Court?
In October, 1969, Curtis Charles Flood, an outfielder for the St.
Louis Cardinals, was traded to the Philadelphia Phillies after
fourteen seasons in the major leagues, twelve of those seasons
with the St. Louis club. As was the practice in the past, as well as
today, Flood was afforded no notice of the trade before the trans-
action was made, and allowed no objection through Club manage-
ment, league structure, or the Commissioner's office.40
Flood then instituted an antitrust suit in the southern district of
New York 4' charging violations of federal antitrust laws and civil
rights statutes, state antitrust statutes and common law, as well
as violations of the thirteenth amendment to the Constitution.42
In detail, Flood alleged that the reserve system constituted a con-
spiracy among the defendants to boycott him, preventing him
from playing baseball with any club other than the Philadelphia
club in violation of the Sherman and Clayton Antitrust Acts. The
state law claims alleged violation of state antitrust and civil rights
statutes as well as state common law, claiming unlawful restraint
of the free exercise of playing professional baseball.43 Under fed-
eral question and civil rights jurisdiction,44 was the allegation that
the reserve system is a form of peonage and involuntary servitude
in violation of the antipeonage statutes4 5 and the thirteenth
would always be the basis of reserve clause discussions; with the ever expanding
involvement of clubs in broadcasting, gate receipts, concessions, and the like, such
activities will not be protected by the baseball antitrust exemption. See generally
H.R. REP. No. 2002, 82d. Cong. 2d Sess. 7, 230 (1952). See also United States v. Na-
tional Football League, 116 F. Supp. 319 (E.D. Pa. 1953) (league restrictions on the
sale of radio and television rights held illegal); State v. Milwaukee Braves, Inc., 31
Wis. 2d 699, 725, 144 N.W.2d 1, 15 (1966).
40. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 265-66 (1972).
41. The defendants, although not all named in each cause of action, were the
Commissioner of Baseball, Bowie K. Kuhn, the presidents of the National and
American Leagues, Joseph E. Cronin and Charles S. Feeney, and all 24 major
league clubs.
42. 407 U.S. at 267. Treble damages and declaratory and injunctive relief were
sought. Id.
43. State and common law jurisdiction over the 24 major league clubs was
based on diversity.
44. 28 U.S. §§ 1331, 1343 (1976).
45. 42 U.S.C. § 1994 (1976); 18 U.S.C. § 1581 (1976).
amendment.46 Lastly, Flood contended that the reserve system
deprived him of "freedom of labor" in violation of the Norris-La-
Guardia Act.47
The Flood action, the most comprehensive challenge to base-
ball's reserve system to reach the courts, was the object of exten-
sive lower court proceedings. 48 However, Flood was not
successful in his judicial challenge. But a look at the underlying
methods of attack is useful in determining whether further at-
tempts may be successfully made in court to correct injustices re-
sulting from the inconsistent and anomalous exemption of
baseball from federal antitrust regulation.
1. Federal Antitrust Contentions
The lower courts' extensive discussion of the antitrust conten-
tions upheld the rulings in Federal Baseball and Toolson. The
courts did not proceed to the issue of whether or not the baseball
reserve system would be deemed reasonable if it was, in fact, sub-
ject to antitrust regulation,49 leaving the baseball exemption in-
tact unless and until the Supreme Court or Congress holds to the
contrary.50
In disposing of the antitrust contentions in the Supreme Court,
the opinion by Mr. Justice Blackmun enumerated a number of
conclusions, once again reaffirming the Court's resolve to relieve
itself of further pressure to change the system on its own. Impor-
tantly, these conclusions stated that, while adhering to Federal
Baseball and Toolson, the Court's continued support for the ex-
emption granted to baseball rested on grounds other than the in-
terstate commerce issue5' by declaring finally that "[p Irofessional
baseball is a business and it is engaged in interstate com-
merce." 52 The alternative grounds set forth by the Court were
based upon more than the previous conclusions that saw congres-
46. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. See note 75 infra.
47. 29 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103 (1976). A fifth and largely unrelated cause of action
against the St. Louis Cardinals and the New York Yankees alleged that certain re-
lationships between those clubs and other non-baseball enterprises were anti-
competitive and were in violation of antitrust laws. 316 F. Supp. 271, 272 n.1 (1970).
The court dismissed the action on summary judgment. 312 F. Supp. 404 (S.D.N.Y.
1970).
48. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972); Flood v. Kuhn, 443 F.2d 264 (1971);
Flood v. Kuhn, 316 F. Supp. 271 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Flood v. Kuhn, 312 F. Supp. 404
(S.D.N.Y. 1970); Flood v. Kuhn, 309 F. Supp. 793 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
49. 316 F. Supp. at 278.
50. Id., 443 F.2d at 266.
51. See National League of Professional Baseball Clubs v. Federal Baseball
Club of Baltimore, Inc., 269 F.2d 681 (1970).
52. 407 U.S. at 282 (emphasis added).
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sional silence as evidencing Congress's tacit approval. 53 Rather,
the Court pointed out that "[sJince Toolson more than fifty bills
have been introduced in Congress relative to the applicability or
nonapplicability of the antitrust laws to baseball,"5 4 and empha-
sized that Congress had not merely been silent on the issue, in-
stead characterizing the rejections of specific proposals as
"positive inaction."55 The Court concluded that it was not disposi-
tive that Congress had failed to act, for they had "acted," in the
Court's view, with no intention to subject baseball's reserve sys-
tem to the reach of its antitrust statutes.5 6
Even in the majority opinion, the Court's rigid adherence to
stare decisis was not uncriticized. Accepting that the application
of Federal Baseball and Toolson had become an "aberration" in
light of the growth of the baseball industry and subsequent judi-
cial holdings in the field of sports and entertainment law, the
Court felt "the aberration is an established one."5 7 Thus, because
this eccentricity had been in decisional law for fifty years as well
as before the Supreme Court on over five occasions, it was
deemed fully entitled to stare decisis by the Court to be remedied
only by congressional legislation.58 The Flood majority effectively
53. See notes 23-28 supra and accompanying text.
54. 407 U.S. at 281.
55. Id. at 284.
56. The Court apparently was referring to a number of cases which expressly
or impliedly held that the antitrust exemption is limited to baseball and not to the
sport or entertainment litigated therein. Haywood v. National Basketball Ass'n,
401 U.S. 1204 (1971) (basketball); see, e.g., Radovich v. National Football League,
352 U.S. 445 (1957) (football); United States v. International Boxing Club, 348 U.S.
236 (1955) (boxing); United States v. Shubert, 348 U.S. 229 (1955) (theatrical pro-
duction); Bridge Corp. of America v. American Contract Bridge League, Inc., 428
F.2d 1365 (9th Cir. 1970) (bridge); Deesen v. Professional Golfers Ass'n, 358 F.2d
165 (9th Cir. 1966) (golf); Washington State Bowling Proprietors Ass'n v. Pacific
Lanes, Inc., 356 F.2d 371 (9th Cir. 1966) (hockey); National Wrestling Alliance v.
Myers, 325 F.2d 768 (8th Cir. 1963) (wrestling); STP Corp. v. United States Auto
Club, Inc., 286 F. Supp. 146 (S.D. Ind. 1968) (auto racing).
57. 407 U.S. at 283.
58. Id. Justices Marshall and Douglas wrote stinging dissents joined by Jus-
tice Brennan. The dissents disputed the validity of reliance on the lack of congres-
sional action and pointed out that the danger of mechanical application of stare
decisis may, in light of later events, deny substantial federal rights. In opposing
the view that the lack of specific congressional action evinced a tacit approval of
the baseball exemption, Mr. Justice Douglas opined:
[IIf congressional inaction is our guide, we should rely upon the fact that
Congress has refused to enact bills broadly exempting professional sports
from antitrust regulation.... I would not ascribe a broader exemption
through inaction than Congress has seen fit to grant explicitly.... The
closed the doors on further judicial discussion of the antitrust is-
sue. The ball was in Congress's "court" to determine the fate of
the baseball anomaly. Future plaintiffs would, thusly, not be well
advised to return to the judicial system armed with only a bat and
the Sherman Act to do battle with baseball's antitrust exemption.
2. The Application of State Antitrust and Congressional
Stalemate
Flood's third cause of action involved the applicability of state
antitrust laws to the reserve mechanism. It was argued that, if
the federal antitrust laws were not in conflict nor applicable to
baseball, then state antitrust laws must be applied. The Supreme
Court summarily dismissed the issues of state antitrust violations
in affirming the judgment of the court of appeals. Nevertheless,
they merit some discussion.
At the district court level the state law claims were rejected be-
cause state antitrust regulation would conflict with the "nation
wide character of organized baseball . . . [which] requires that
there be uniformity in any regulation of baseball and its reserve
system."5 9 In affirming the district court, the court of appeals
stated that, "as the burden on interstate commerce outweighs the
states' interests in regulating baseball's reserve system, the Com-
merce Clause precludes the application of state antitrust law."60
Congress has made no express provision that the business of
organized baseball is to be left free of state or federal control. If
such provision were to be in existence, there would be no ques-
tion that the states would have no power to challenge, through
their antitrust laws, the present reserve system. 6' Nevertheless,
there is no such provision and, thus, a question is whether Con-
gress has manifested an intent to keep baseball free of state con-
trol. In Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 62 the Court addressed
this issue stating that
[t]he failure of Congress to regulate interstate commerce has generally
been taken to signify a Congressional purpose to leave undisturbed the
unbroken silence of Congress should not prevent us from correcting our
own mistakes.
407 U.S. at 287-88. (Douglas, J., dissenting); see also Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S.
106 (1940). "It would require very persuasive circumstances enveloping Congres-
sional silence to debar this Court from re-examining its own doctrines .... [WJe
walk on quicksand when we try to find in the absence of corrective legislation a
controlling legal principle." Id. at 119-21. See also United States v. Southeastern
Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 553 (1944).
59. 316 F. Supp. at 279-80.
60. 443 F.2d at 268.
61. Preemption is authorized by the supremacy clause of the United States
Constitution.
62. 306 U.S. 466 (1939).
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authority of the states to make regulations affecting the commerce in mat-
ters of peculiarly local concern, but to withhold from them authority to
make regulations affecting those phases of it which, because of the need
of a national uniformity, demand that their regulation, if any, be pre-
scribed by a single authority.
6 3
The courts have gleaned a congressional intent to keep baseball
free from antitrust regulation and have further surmised that, as a
corollary principle, the application of other antitrust provisions
defeats the congressional intention of non-regulation. Such appli-
cation renders impotent the policy reasons behind the federal ex-
emptions. However, this belies the fact that even in the face of
many proposals, Congress has not seen fit to "unexempt" base-
ball, nor have they seen fit to reinforce the exemption, judicially
conferred, in light of repeated calls for a congressional stand on
the issue.
Two theories have arisen to justify the preempting of state an-
titrust application. The first presumes the recognition by Con-
gress that the structure of organized baseball, and the growth of
its business relationships and internal agreements which have
been in reliance on the federal exemption, are all integral compo-
nents of organized baseball as it now exists. Therefore, the appli-
cation of any type of antitrust provision would be inappropriate,
and congressional acquiescence does not evince a desire to leave
the industry to ad hoc regulation by the states. This theory, by
itself, may not be enough to obviate state regulation. In support,
Welch Co. v. New Hampshire64 created a clear manifestation re-
quirement holding that,
[iIn construing federal statutes enacted under the power conferred by the
commerce clause of the Constitution. . . it should never be held that Con-
gress intends to supercede or suspend the exercise of the reserved powers
of a state, even where that may be done, unless, and except so far as, its
purpose to do so is clearly manifested.
6 5
The dissent in State v. Milwaukee Braves, Inc. suggests, in reac-
tion to Welch, "[t]hat [the clear manifestation requirement] be-
ing the standard where specific legislation is involved, can there,
be a less rigorous criterion than the preemption of state police
power where our only clue to congressional intent is nonac-
tion?" 66 Thus, the congressional intention theory, in absence of
63. Id. at 479 n.1.
64. 306 U.S. 79 (1939).
65. Id. at 85 (quoting Illinois Central R. Co. v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 245
U.S. 493, 510 (1918) (emphasis added).
66. 31 Wis. 2d at 734, 144 N.W. 2d at 19.
additional support, may not be sufficient to justify preemption of
state antitrust laws. It must be shown that the silence of Con-
gress fails to establish or indicate a national policy regarding
baseball that is sufficiently certain to rise to the level of federal
preemption of state policy.67
The blow to state antitrust regulation in Flood was the result of
the coupling of the congressional intent theory with the view that
the operation of organized baseball is so nationwide in character
that uniformity of regulation is a necessity, and in that baseball is
a business which operates in interstate commerce, 68 regulation,
even if not controlled expressly by Congress, may not unduly bur-
den interstate commerce. Thus, there is an area of interstate
commerce within which a state may not operate at all because the
application of various state laws would seriously interfere with
commerce, here organized baseball, among the states. As man-
dated by Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona,69 baseball would have to
comply with the strictest state standard in order to permit regula-
tion by non-conflicting states. 70 This burden on league operation
outweighed the states' interest in the Flood case, as it most likely
would with any challenge to the reserve system. Absent a strong
state interest the application of state law would place an imper-
missible burden on interstate commerce.7 1
The above discussion of state action, while impermissible in the
Flood case, points out that there may be instances where state
law will lie, but the injury to the state 72 would have to exceed the
kind of injury involved in a reserve clause challenge. If only the
congressional intent defense is used, it may be more easily de-
feated than if it is coupled with the uniform regulation theory. It
is well settled that a state may exercise its police powers by
means of its antitrust law, provided that the law or its application
does not discriminate against interstate commerce or disrupt its
required uniformity.73 Nonetheless, Flood has effectively elimi-
nated the possibility that a reserve clause challenge may be sub-
67. 316 F. Supp. at 279.
68. It is interesting to note the changes in the role that interstate commerce
has played since the Federal Baseball decision. For example, state antitrust
power is rendered virtually impotent by the need for uniform operation of the
commerce which baseball engenders between the states. Organized baseball now
argues the importance of the uniform nature of interstate commerce while press-
ing the need for a void in the regulation of baseball altogether.
69. 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
70. Id. at 774-75.
71. Id.
72. For example, club action may so affect the economic well-being of the state
or the health and welfare of its citizens thereby outweighing any incidental bur-
den on interstate commerce.
73. 31 Wis. 2d at 739, 144 N.W.2d at 22 (citing Huron Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362
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ject to state antitrust laws for its holding falls squarely within the
preclusion of the Commerce Clause and the necessity for uni-
formity, despite challenges that may be made on the congres-
sional intent theory.
3. Involuntary Servitude
The fourth cause of action in the Flood case asserted that the
reserve system violated the thirteenth amendment and its enforc-
ing legislation which similarly prohibits holding any person to
"involuntary servitude."74
Involuntary servitude is not a charge that is common to modern
day pleading.7 5 Yet the assertion has come up in baseball litiga-
tion since 1914 in American League Baseball Club of Chicago v.
Chase.76 In Chase, Judge Bissell characterized the conditions of
employment that a ballplayer is subjected to as follows:.
If a baseball player . . who has made baseball playing his profession and
means of earning a livelihood, desires to be employed at the work for
which he is qualified and is entitled to earn his best compensation, he
must submit to dominion over his personal freedom and the control of his
services by sale, transfer, or exchange, without his consent, or abandon
his vocation and seek employment at some other kind of labor .... [T]he
involuntary character of the servitude which is imposed upon the players
... is so great as to make it necessary for the player to either take the
contract prescribed by the commission or abandon baseball as a profes-
U.S. 440, 448 (1960)). See also the dissent in Milwaukee Braves for a good discus-
sion of feasible actions to uphold state regulation.
74. 316 F. Supp. at 280. Jurisdiction to grant relief for a violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1584 is found in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343. Id. The court also considered Flood's
contention that the antipeonage statutes and the public policy declared in the Nor-
ris-La Guardia Act had been violated and the court concluded that they were inap-
plicable. In addition, it was noted that the plaintiff's post-trial brief argued only
the involuntary servitude claim and that the court assumed that the plaintiff no
longer alleged violation of antipeonage statutes and the Norris-La Guardia Act.
Id. at n.1.
75. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. "Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, ex-
cept as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted,
shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction."
76. 86 Misc. 441, 149 N.Y.S. 6 (1949). In Chase, the Chicago Club of the Ameri-
can League sought to enjoin one of its contract players from playing baseball with
any club other than Chicago for the term of his contract. The court denied the in-
junction on the grounds of lack of mutuality of contract and unclean hands. The
finding of lack of mutuality stemmed from the complete control exercised over
Chase as balanced against the right of the club to terminate Chase upon 10 days
notice. Although Chase was not a reserve rule case, the court, while holding the
Sherman Act inapplicable, cited baseball's monopolistic practices as an "uncon-
scionable transaction" and held that it would not further the practices by render-
ing aid by means of an injunction. Id. at 16, 20.
sion.77
The Chase court went on to say that, "[t] he right to employ his
labor and capital as he pleases for any lawful purpose is an essen-
tial part of the personal liberty guaranteed each man by free insti-
tutions."78 "The quasi-peonage of baseball players under the
operations of this plan and agreement is contrary to the spirit of
American institutions, and is contrary to the spirit of the Consti-
tution of the United States." 79
Influenced by the involuntary servitude question, courts have
refused to order mandatory injunctions obligating a transferred8 0
ballplayer to report to a transferee club. 81 Nevertheless, the effec-
tiveness of the reserve rules have traditionally stemmed from the
blacklisting practices of club and league management,82 which ef-
fectively leave a player with the choice of either playing the game
by management's rules or not playing at all.
Acquainted with only the largest salary figures and success sto-
ries in professional baseball, the peonage argument seems to be a
bit tainted in the public eye. Yet Judge Frank aptly put this in
perspective in Gardella v. Chandler83 stating, "if the players be
regarded as quasi-peons, it is of no moment that they are well
paid; only the totalitarian-minded will believe that high pay ex-
cuses virtual slavery." 84
Stinging criticisms of the baseball reserve system were princi-
pally relied upon by plaintiff Flood in advancing his involuntary
servitude claim. Nevertheless, the court of appeals minimized
their potential impact and looked instead to a different view of pe-
onage, the thirteenth amendment, and involuntary servitude. In
relying upon two cases brought before the Supreme Court, Pol-
lack v. Williams and Hodges v. United States,8 5 Judge Cooper
held that a showing of a condition of enforced compulsory service
is a prerequisite to proof of involuntary servitude.8 6
77. 86 Misc. at 465, 149 N.Y.S. at 19.
78. Id. at 464, 149 N.Y.S. at 18 (citing 1 ARTHuR J. EDDY, EDDY ON COMBINA-
TIONS § 559 (1901)).
79. 86 Misc. at 465, 149 N.Y.S. at 19.
80. Transfer here refers to the purchase, sale, trade, waiver, or draft of ball-
player services. Although perhaps of only historical import, ballplayers have been
transferred for as little as 25 cents, a bird dog, a bulldog, a turkey, and an airplane.
Comment, Monopsony in Manpower: Organized Baseball Meets the Antitrust
Laws, 62 YALE L.J. 576, 587 n.59 (1953).
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. 172 F.2d 402 (1949).
84. Id. at 410.
85. Pollack v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4 (1944) (with respect to peonage and the thir-
teenth amendment); Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1 (1906) (with respect to in-
voluntary servitude and the thirteenth amendment).
86. 316 F. Supp. at 281.
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The court failed to lend import to the fact that a ballplayer was,
in fact, compelled to accept terms and conditions that require him
to relinquish the freedom to pursue his trade where he could pro-
cure a position. The appellate court felt that as long as the ball-
player was left to pursue another career entirely, the thirteenth
amendment and enforcing statutes were not violated. The court
only addressed the legal precedents on the issue of involuntary
servitude and did not express opinion as to the substantially simi-
lar effect the reserve system and compulsory service has on an
employee.87 It seemed of little consequence to the court that a
ballplayer under contract to a club is compelled to serve under
the kind of control present in few, if any, other vocations. His
only alternative may be to break the contract and be precluded
from ever again practicing his trade, unless with his previous em-
ployer or its assignee.
D. The Congress and the Court-A Joint Finger in the Dike
The Flood case was, thusly, disposed of on all four counts. This
made it expressly clear that baseball's reserve system is not sub-
ject to antitrust attack in the courts. As long as the reserve sys-
tem is seen by all parties as part and parcel of the operation and
maintenance of league structure and Congress has not seen fit to
alter its present status by limiting or abolishing the baseball ex-
emption, the courts will not be an effective forum in which to
challenge the reserve system on antitrust grounds.
Flood was a major blow to the young Players Association and
its membership. The courts had closed their doors and refused to
right admitted wrongs, choosing instead to rely on an anomalous
application of stare decisis in refusing to grant relief from a sys-
tem which claimed perpetual control of employees in an industry
"rife with violation of the Sherman Act." 88
In the face of judicial challenges to baseball's reserve mecha-
nisms, antitrust law has been rendered virtually impotent. The
87. The court's only reference to the effect of the reserve system did not sug-
gest alternative legal or legislative theory:
We recognize that, under the existing rules of baseball, by refusing to re-
port to Philadelphia plaintiff is by his own act foreclosing himself from
continuing a professional baseball career, a consequence to be deplored.
Nevertheless, he has a right to retire and to embark upon a different en-
terprise outside organized baseball.
Id.
88. 31 Wis. 2d at 729, 144 N.W.2d at 17.
lower courts have refused to act in deference to the Supreme
Court; the Supreme Court has refused to act in deference to im-
plied congressional intent; and Congress has refused to act, pe-
riod. Although legislation has been introduced in the 82d, 85th,
86th, 87th, 88th, 89th, and 91st Congresses, respective of antitrust
and sports legislation, nothing has come of the call for a stand on
the baseball exemption. In response to the Flood decision, the
House quickly introduced two bills and conducted a subcommit-
tee hearing.8 9 But, true to form,90 the legislation died as mechani-
cally as it had been introduced. Again in 1977, the Joint House
Committee on Professional Sports stated that there was no justifi-
cation for baseball's immunity from the antitrust laws, and recom-
mended that Congress remove the exemption. But at present,
Congress has taken no substantive action.
The reason for congressional inaction may lie in the fact that
there has been insufficient external pressure exerted upon the na-
89. H.R. 12401, H.R. 14614, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
90. In 1952 three bills were introduced in the House of Representatives (HR
4229, HR 4230 and HR 4231), and one bill in the Senate which enumerated a blan-
ket antitrust exemption to all professional sports organizations and their activities.
The House subcommittee issued its report to the 82d Congress after extensive
hearings on the bills. H.R. REP. No. 2002, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1952). The sub-
committee's report was unfavorable to the passage of the bills, and concluded that
baseball should not be granted complete immunity from antitrust scrutiny. Id. at
230. Nevertheless, assured by organized baseball that its activities would be judi-
cially tested by a reasonableness standard, along with the desire not to interfere
with pending litigation, here Toolson et. al., the subcommittee recommended that
no legislative action be taken. Id. at 231-32.
The Toolson decision followed, with baseball management asserting that anti-
trust did not apply to baseball and that it would bring about baseball's demise if it
did. A series of bills were the subject of a subcommittee investigation in 1957 rela-
tive to enacting some variety of antitrust exemption for professional sports. Hear-
ings on H.R. 5307, et al., before the Antitrust Subcomm. of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957). The House all but ignored these bills. In
1958, the House Judiciary Committee recommended passage of H.R. 10378, a bill
which was drawn to subject professional baseball, football and hockey to the anti-
trust laws, but provided an exemption to activities which were designed to protect
public confidence and integrity in the sport, franchise territories and balance of
competition if they satisfied a reasonableness standard. H.R. REP. No. 1720, 85th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1958) (commonly known as the Celler Report). Much debate was
engendered by the bill and despite its recommendation, it was only passed when
the bill was greatly emasculated by the removal of the reasonableness standard.
Nevertheless, the bill was tabled in the Senate subcommittee and died at the close
of the 85th Congress.
Seven bills introduced in the House of Representatives died without action dur-
ing the 86th Congress. One hotly debated bill introduced into the Senate, S. 3483,
was resubmitted to committee but never reappeared.
In the 87th and 88th Congresses bills were introduced and quickly discussed, ig-
nored or forgotten. The only sport-related bill passed was a broadcasting rights
bill in the 87th Congress. Baseball emerged unscathed from the 89th and 91st
Congress, where again, bills never found their way out of committee. For an excel-
lent discussion of the bills introduced during this period see L SOBEL, PROFEs-
SIONAL SPORTS AND THE LAw § 1.2(c) (1977).
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tion's legislative representatives to sustain any action to dissolve
the exemption. Handicapping any effort on the part of organized
baseball to eliminate the exemption is the lack of an influential
power base in any of the geographical areas where it operates.
Other industries have a larger number of employees concentrated
in one or more states or localities enabling the possibility of
greater impact upon local representatives. Baseball employees,
on the other hand, are scattered sparsely throughout the country
where an appeal to local representation would create minimal im-
pact in comparison. Nevertheless, Congress seems to remain the
only governmental avenue open to eliminate baseball's anomaly.
There has been no sound reason set forth to support the existing
continuance of this aberration and the laws applicable to profes-
sional sports need to be standardized.
The need for the abolition of the antitrust exemption reached a
crisis point after the Court, in Flood, waived its power over the
issue. Baseball careers were under management control in
perpetuity in blatant violation of the thrust and spirit of antitrust
law. Lacking the collective strength to influence a congressional
stand on the issue, the only recourse for player-employees was to
the labor laws. The system of collective bargaining in organized
baseball was viewed as the only vehicle through which the tradi-
tional reserve rules could be challenged after Flood. It was
through this system that the reserve rules were effectively at-
tacked a few short years later.
III. THE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING PROCESS As IT OPERATES IN
ORGANIZED BASEBALL
Collective bargaining has only recently become an important
force in the sports industry. Although the Major League Baseball
Players Association was organized in the mid 1950's, the workings
of its initial decade, like that of its predecessor the American
Baseball Guild, were dominated by team ownership and league
management. Not until 1966, with the hiring of former steelwork-
ers' union official Marvin Miller, did the association see leader-
ship truly dedicated to representing the welfare of its members in
the union stance.
A. The Mechanics of Collective Bargaining in Baseball
In 1969, the National Labor Relations Board held, in American
League of Professional Baseball Clubs,91 that organized profes-
sional baseball is an industry in, or affecting commerce, and is
thereby subject to National Labor Relations Act coverage as well
as NLRB jurisdiction. 92 The case also indicated that the players
association, which previously lacked union status, was a labor or-
ganization within the meaning of the Act.93 With jurisdiction and
coverage conferred, the Act guarantees to those under its protec-
tion "the right to self-organization, to form, join or assist labor or-
ganizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of
their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for
the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid and pro-
tection, and ... to refrain from any or all such activities. . .."94
The Major League Baseball Players Association is now recog-
nized as the exclusive95 bargaining agent for all members of the
association. This carries with it certain duties which the associa-
tion must carry out in representing the nation's major league
baseball players.9 6 The Act imposes on the Union, as well as
their management counterparts, the duty to bargain in good
faith 97 with respect to mandatory subjects of bargaining. The fail-
ure to do so is an unfair labor practice.9 8 The Supreme Court has
defined "good faith bargaining" as that which evinces a "willing-
ness to enter into negotiations with an open and fair mind and
91. 180 N.L.R.B. 190 (1969).
92. Id. at 192-93.
93. Id. A labor organization is defined in the National Labor Relations Act
§ 2(5), 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (1976), as "any organization . . . which exists for the pur-
pose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor
disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work."
94. National Labor Relations Act § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976).
95. National Labor Relations Act § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1976).
96. Duties of good faith bargaining, fair representation, and subject matter
classification play important roles in any challenge to proposed restraint mecha-
nisms. Violation of any prescribed duties or misclassification will subject an
agreement to scrutiny.
97. National Labor Relations Act § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1976), provides:
(d) For purposes of this section, to bargain collectively is the perform-
ance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of
the employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with
respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment,
or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder,
and the execution of a written contract incorporating any agreement
reached if requested by either party, but such obligation does not compel
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession.
Id.
98. National Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1976).
"(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer... (5) to refuse to
bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees, subject to the pro-
visions of section 159(a) of this title." Id.
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with a sincere desire to reach a mutual basis for agreement." 99
The Players Association is also required to fairly represent all
members of the Union, that is, not to bargain more effectively for
one class of players than another. Baseball's Basic Agreement
covers only the minimum terms and conditions of employment.
Although the Union is the exclusive bargaining representative for
the players and required to negotiate on behalf of all members
equally, individual players are allowed to negotiate more
favorable terms with their respective clubs, on their own, by
means of special covenants in the Uniform Player Contract.100
The subject matter of collective bargaining in baseball includes
all matters which relate to the terms and conditions of the em-
ployment of the ballplayers.1 0 1 Both management and the Play-
ers Association recognize the reserve system to be a mandatory
subject of collective bargaining.10 2 Thus, the reserve system issue
is forced onto the bargaining table to be dealt with under the
watchful eye of the NLRA.
The rights and duties of the parties to collective bargaining
briefly enumerated above, will serve to illuminate what rules have
affected past events respecting collective bargaining and the re-
serve clause, and set the stage upon which upcoming controversy
will play.
B. Opening Day: The Reserve Rules in the Arbitration Arena
Unlike athletes in other sports 0 3 who may use the threat of an-
titrust litigation to prevent certain mobility restraints and, thus,
obtain a greater level of negotiating power at the bargaining table,
the collective bargaining process currently offers baseball players
their only mode of challenge to the player reserve system. The
99. J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, THE LAW OF SPORTS 803 n.203 (1979) (citing
NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149 (1956)); H.J. Heinz Co. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 514
(1941).
100. See generally Midland Broadcasting, 93 N.L.R.B. 455 (1951); Television
Film Producers Ass'n., 93 N.LR.B. 929 (1951) (discussion of individual contract
provisions negotiated with terms less favorable than union agreements).
101. National Labor Relations Act § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. 8(d) (1976).
102. 316 F. Supp at 283.
103. See note 56 mupra. The threat of antitrust litigation may temper manage-
ment's stance in effecting certain practices, whether the subject of a labor dispute
or not. Antitrust has an important place in the system of checks and balances that
allows management and workers to operate fairly in an atmosphere that benefits
both free enterprise and the public welfare, the cornerstones of our democratic so-
ciety.
process of collective bargaining has correspondingly become par-
ticularly important to the modification of traditional player con-
trol.
Following the disposition of the Flood case came the debut of
collective bargaining's role respecting the reserve clause. The in-
clusion of both the reserve clause and the grievance-arbitration
procedures in the 1973 Basic Agreement gave rise to the first suc-
cessful challenge to the perpetual system of player control.
The 1970 Basic Agreement had provided for a tripartite griev-
ance arbitration panel with a permanent impartial chairman.10 4
Article X of the 1973 Basic Agreement set forth further proce-
dures for the resolution of certain grievances. These included
presentation of the grievance to the player's club, provision for
appeal to the Clubs' Player Relations Committee and the League
President, as well as a final step providing for resolution by tripar-
tite panel in binding arbitration. "Grievance" was defined as a:
[C]omplaint which involves the interpretation of, or compliance with the
provisions of any agreement between the Association and the Clubs or
any of them, or any agreement between a Player and a Club 1 0 5 . . . ex-
cepting disputes related to the Benefit Plan, the Agreement re the Benefit
Plan, dues checkoff, as well as action taken by the Commission relating to
maintenance of the integrity of baseball or disputes involving public ap-
pearances as stated in paragraph 3(c) of the Uniform Players Contract.1 0 6
Article X also defined the arbitrators' authority as follows:
With regard to the arbitration of Grievances, the Arbitration Panel shall
have jurisdiction and authority only to interpret, apply or determine com-
pliance with provisions of agreements between the Association and the
Clubs or any of them, and agreements between individual Players and
Clubs. The Arbitration Panel shall not have jurisdiction or authority to
add to, detract from, or alter in any way the provisions of such agree-
ments.
10 7
Following these procedures in October of 1975, the Players As-
sociation filed grievances on behalf of Andy Messersmith of the
Los Angeles Dodgers and Dave McNally of the Montreal Expos.
The grievances alleged that the language of paragraph 10(a) of
the Uniform Players Contract0 8 gave the club the right to renew
104. Prior to 1970 the Commissioner of Baseball held the power over disputes
concerning bargaining agreements.
105. This is the Basic Agreement between the American League of Professional
Baseball Clubs and the National League of Professional Baseball Clubs and Major
League Baseball Players Association effective January 1, 1973, Article X [hereinaf-
ter referred to as the 1973 Basic Agreement].
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Paragraph 10(a) of the Uniform Players Contract provides:
10(a) On or before December 20 (or if a Sunday, then the next preceding
business day) in the year of the last playing season covered by this con-
tract, the Club may tender to the Player a contract for the term of that
year by mailing the same to the Player at his address following his signa-
ture hereto, or if none be given, then at his last address of record with the
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the contract for one year on the same terms, but that the contrac-
tual relationship between the club and the athlete terminated at
the end of the renewal period. The grievance further alleged that
the club owners had denied both Messersmith and McNally the
right to deal with other teams for their services upon expiration of
the renewal period, and asked that the club owners be ordered to
treat both athletes as free agents and to compensate them for any
financial detriment incurred by club owner delays. In response to
the grievances and relative to the merits, the owners countered
with the assertion that upon renewal of the contract, the club re-
newed all contractual terms including that term which gave the
club the right to renew the contract originally, thereby rendering
the right to renew perpetual. 0 9 But the club owners' primary
contention in response to the grievances was that the claims were
outside the scope of the grievance procedure and, therefore, not
subject to the jurisdiction of the arbitration panel. They argued
that Article XV of the 1973 Basic Agreement excluded disputes
concerning the "core" or "heart" of the reserve system from Arti-
cle X procedures." 0
The grievances were submitted to arbitration"' and on Decem-
Club. If prior to March 1 next succeeding said December 20, the Player
and the Club have not agreed upon the terms of such contract, then on or
before 10 days after said March 1, the Club shall have the right by written
notice to the player at said address to renew this contract for the period of
one year on the same terms, except that the amount payable to the Player
shall be such as the Club shall fix it in said notices; provided, however,
that said amount, if fixed by a Major League Club, shall be an amount
payable at a rate not less than 80% of the rate stipulated for the next pre-
ceding year and at a rate not less than 70% of the rate stipulated for the
year immediately prior to the next preceding year.
UPC § 10(a).
109. National League and American League of Professional Baseball Clubs v.
Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, Grievance Nos. 75-27, 75-28. Decision of the
Arbitration Panel No. 29 (Dec. 23, 1975) (Seitz, Miller, and Gaherin arb.).
110. Article XV in the 1973 Basic Agreement provided:
Except as adjusted or modified hereby, this Agreement does not deal
with the reserve system. The Parties have differing views as to the legal-
ity and as to the merits of such system as presently constituted. This
Agreement shall in no way prejudice the position or legal rights of the
Parties or of any Player regarding the reserve system. During the term of
this Agreement neither of the Parties will resort to any concerted action
with respect to the issue of the reserve system, and there shall be no obli-
gation to negotiate with respect to the reserve system.
Id. reprinted in Kansas City Royals Baseball Corp. v. Major League Baseball
Players Ass'n, 532 F.2d 615, 618-19 (1976).
111. Before the matter was submitted to arbitration, the Kansas City Royals
Baseball Corporation fied suit in the United States District Court for the Western
District of Missouri seeking a declaratory judgment that the grievances were non-
ber 23, 1975, the panel" 2 rendered its decision. The holding in-
volved a monumental interpretation of the Uniform Players
Contract and the Major League Rules in deciding that the rele-
vant provisions did not renew the contract in perpetuity, thereby
denying the right of a club to perpetually control a player. Mes-
sersmith and McNally were declared free agents. Additionally,
the panel held that the grievances were within the scope of its ju-
risdiction. It directed that Messersmith and McNally be removed
from the disqualified or reserve lists and that the leagues
promptly notify their members that they may negotiate with the
ballplayers with respect to employment. The panel did deny the
damage claim as premature, but retained jurisdiction over the
matter. Following the panel decision, the club owners revived the
district court action.113 The district court held that the Messer-
smith-McNally grievances were within the scope of the panel's ju-
risdiction and that neither the resolution of the merits, nor the
relief awarded, exceeded the panel's authority. Therefore, the
court ordered enforcement of the panel's award.114 Subsequently,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed
the district court." 5
By this action, the players were finally emancipated from a con-
trol system that had traditionally bound each player to the club
with which he first signed a contract for the rest of his playing
days. The players were exultant over the decision and, for the
first time, possessed bargaining power to control their own desti-
nies.
C. Finally a Forum: Limitations and Strategies
No discussion of the Messersmith-McNally arbitration can be
made without noting that the panel decision did not alter or con-
demn the existing reserve system on moral or constitutional
arbitrable and an injunction to prohibit the arbitration. The remaining 23 major
league clubs joined the action as plaintiff-intervenors. The Players Association
counterclaimed, seeking to compel the plaintiffs to arbitrate pursuant to the La-
bor-Management Relations Act § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1976). The parties stipulated
at the pretrial hearing that the arbitration could proceed, reserving the right to re-
vive the district court action after the panel rendered its decision. 532 F.2d at 619.
112. The panel consisted of Marvin J. Miller, the Players Association arbitrator,
John J. Gaherin, Club Owners arbitrator, and Peter Seitz, who was chairman and
impartial arbitrator selected by the other two arbitrators.
113. See note 110 supra.
114. 409 F. Supp. 233 (W.D. Mo. 1976).
115. 532 F.2d 615 (8th Cir. 1976). The proceedings in both courts were extensive,
and afford a comprehensive and informative discussion relative to the courts'
power to examine an arbitration hearing and recent developments concerning in-
terpretation and effect of the reserve system.
338
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grounds.116 Any attempt to alter agreements made by league
management and the players association is not the function of an
arbitration panel and should not be resorted to as such. The
proper place for that is the bargaining table and, in the alterna-
tive, the courts. The function of arbitration is to interpret, apply,
or determine compliance with provisions of previously negotiated
agreements. The Messersmith-McNally arbitration did just that
in determining that the nature of the parties' agreement regarding
the renewal clause of the reserve system, as evidenced in the Uni-
form Players Contract, did not provide for perpetual club control.
Judicial review of an arbitration award is limited to the ques-
tion of whether it "draws its essence from the collective bargain-
ing agreement."117 The courts may not be resorted to as an
appellate tribunal to review the merits of an arbitration panel's
decision by parties who have subjected themselves to binding ar-
bitration."18 The courts may resolve the question of whether a
grievance under a collective bargaining agreement providing for
arbitration is arbitrable.1 9 The Supreme Court discussed the le-
gal principles applicable to the arbitration of labor disputes in the
Steelworkers trilogy,120 reaffirming them in 1974, in Gateway Coal
Co. v. United Mine Workers of America.121 The Court deemed ar-
bitrable, "a grievance arising under a collective bargaining agree-
ment providing for arbitration . . . 'unless it may be said with
positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of
an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute. Doubts should
be resolved in favor of coverage.'"122 The arbitration provision in
the last two Basic Agreements have been broad, subject to certain
enumerated grievances which are to be excluded from the griev-
ance procedures. It is likely that, to foreclose arbitration, a party
initially will assert that a particular grievance is not arbitrable, if
there is some basis, however tenuous to do so. This was the case
116. 532 F.2d at 631.
117. United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel and Car Corp., 363
U.S. 593, 597 (1960).
118. 532 F.2d at 621.
119. The question is one of contract construction and is for the courts to decide.
Id. at 620.
120. United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960);
United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior and Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574
(1960); United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593
(1960).
121. 414 U.S. 368 (1974).
122. 532 F.2d at 620 (citations omitted).
in the challenge to the Messersmith-McNally arbitration. But, the
courts have fashioned a strict standard of review for such a com-
plaint. The Supreme Court has given sanction to the rule that a
broad arbitration provision may be deemed to exclude a particu-
lar grievance in only two instances: (1) where the collective bar-
gaining agreement contains an express provision clearly
excluding the grievance involved from arbitration; or (2) where
the agreement contains an ambiguous exclusionary provision and
the record evinces the most forceful evidence of a purpose to ex-
clude the grievance from arbitration.1 23 Review will be based pri-
marily on the language of the agreement although the court has
the power to receive other evidence presented to it.
Thus, the players association, on behalf of an aggrieved player
or players, may resort to arbitration and grievance procedures to
assert rights which have been collectively bargained for. Previ-
ously subject to the unilateral decision of club and league man-
agement, the athlete now finds himself represented at the
bargaining table where the acts and policies of all parties are
judged in terms of their compliance with the National Labor Rela-
tions Act. As the years have passed, the power of the Players As-
sociation has increased, resulting in improvements in the terms
and conditions of employment. Importantly, the collective bar-
gaining process may afford a tribunal where complaints may be
aired and effectively resolved pursuant to agreement by the par-
ties reached in the bargaining process. The reserve system, per-
haps the most troublesome aspect in the structure of organized
baseball, has found a forum where it may be discussed, bargained
for, then made the subject of agreement of both parties. The Mes-
sersmith-McNally arbitration prompted the owners and players to
go to the bargaining table to seriously determine the future of the
reserve clause.' 24 The owners were finally forced to "play ball"
with the Players Association, and the unilateral domination of re-
straint systems had come to an end.
123. Id. at 621.
124. This is not to say that there had been no previous discussion of the reserve
clause between the Players Association and the owners. But the Association and
the owners had never been forced to come to terms. As early as August 1967, the
Players Association included in its policy statement a passage doubting the legal-
ity of the reserve system and called for a reasoned, open-minded approach toward
some accommodation. The first Basic Agreement executed in February 1968, effec-
tive through February 1970, provided for a joint study of the reserve system, but
no specific proposals were made and no joint study was conducted. Proposals
were bandied about in 1969, but the club owners staunchly supported the status
quo. Then in February of 1970, the Players Association and the clubs stipulated
that neither party would bargain with respect to the reserve system until the
Flood action was adjudicated. This was the situation until the negotiation of the
1976 Basic Agreement. See generally 316 F. Supp. at 283-84 n.18.
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The 1976 Basic Agreement included, for the first time in history
of baseball, a provision respecting the parties' agreement as to the
reserve system.125 The crux of the provision allowed any player
whose contract was executed on, or after August 9, 1976, to be-
come a free agent if he had six or more years of Major League
service and he had not executed a contract for the next suc-
ceeding season. Article XVII of the 1976 Basic Agreement repre-
sented the essence of collective bargaining with both parties
making proposals less stringent than those made in the course of
the Messersmith-McNally arbitration, resulting in a middle
ground reached by agreement of club owners and the players as-
sociation.126
But as "fair" as the process has seemed to be, the controversy
surrounding the reserve system has not, unfortunately, come to
an end.
IV. ANTrrRUST APPLICATIONS AND THE LABOR EXEMPTION
The future of antitrust in sports litigation has engendered much
controversy and debate of ideological differences.127 It has been
offered that as a byproduct of the labor exemption, antitrust is no
longer a predominant feature of disputes in professional athletics,
primarily owing to the advent of collective bargaining. The rela-
tive weight that this lends to counteract the efforts of those advo-
cating the abolition of the antitrust exemption could be
devastating. 28 It is suggested here that antitrust could still be an
important device to maintain a checking influence on the bargain-
ing process as baseball enters the 1980's. Therefore, it is still of
major importance that baseball's antitrust exemption be dis-
solved. The following illustrates how the antitrust laws would ap-
125. The Basic Agreement between the American League of Professional Base-
ball Clubs and National League of Professional Baseball Clubs and the Major
League Baseball Players Association effective January 1, 1976, Article XVII [here-
inafter the 1976 Basic Agreement]. The text of Article XVII of the 1976 Basic
Agreement is included in the Appendix, infra.
126. This agreement was not reached by calm and unruffled negotiation. An
owners' lockout closed spring training for 13 days until Commissioner Kuhn re-
opened the camps. The players and owners agreed to the Basic Agreement in July
of 1976.
127. See, e.g., Kheel & Millstein, Professional Sports: Has Antitrust Killed the
Goose That Laid the Golden Egg? 45 ANrrrRusT L.J. 290 (1976).
128. The lack of geographical power bases and congressional dormancy on the
subject are only further aggravated by the decline in the significance of antitrust
applicability.
ply to baseball, the effect of the labor exemption and the role that
antitrust would play in the forthcoming negotiations, should the
anomaly be destroyed.
A. Antitrust Standards
Liability under the Sherman Act is not absolute,129 although the
language appears absolute on its face. By forming different stan-
dards to determine liability, the courts have demonstrated a toler-
ance to certain alleged violations which have been defended as
having overriding justification in spite of anticompetitive effects.
Antitrust liability is therefore to be evaluated by either of two
tests; the "per se" approach and the "rule of reason" test. It
would be preferable, from the standpoint of a baseball plaintiff, to
have the challenged conduct deemed "illegal per se." The Sher-
man Act absolutely prohibits certain activities that are clearly
contrary to public policy, deeming them illegal per se. Examples
of such activities are: horizontal price-fixing agreements,130 tying
arrangements,131 division of markets,132 and secondary or group
boycotts. 133 Strict application of the per se approach precludes
the admissibility of any evidence proffered to justify a particular
restraint.134 Since justification is not a relevant inquiry in a per se
case, the baseball plaintiff does not have the burden of overcom-
ing any evidence tending to make reasonably necessary an activ-
ity that otherwise violates antitrust law. The burden upon a
baseball plaintiff is correspondingly minimal in comparison with
analysis by the rule of reason.
Historically, baseball ownerships engaged in open price-fixing
by dividing the player market and refusing to deal with, in effect,
129. Although the language of the Sherman Act seemingly proscribes all con-
tracts or combinations in restraint of trade, a lesser standard of review was formu-
lated in Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). There,
the Court established the rule of reason test, declaring only unreasonable re-
straints of trade to be illegal.
130. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940). Price fixing
agreements between parties within the same competitive level may well be shown
to be an effect of a future reserve system given the present stance of management
but the argument seems less cogent in the face of today's free market.
131. International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 393 (1947).
132. Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
133. Klor's v. Broadway-Hale Stores Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959). A secondary boy-
cott has been defined as "the application of coercive pressure upon a third party to
refrain from dealing with a competitor of the party applying the pressure." Note,
Baseball's Antitrust Exemption and the Reserve System: Reappraisal of An Anar-
chronism, 12 WM. & MARY L. REV. 859, 870 n.68 (1971). Today it appears that there
is much less likelihood of the success of a secondary boycott charge, with respect
to the reserve system, than as it stood pre-1976.
134. See, e.g., Fashion Originators Guild of America, Inc. v. F.T.C., 312 U.S. 457
(1941).
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blacklisting, any player who did not wish to play for his original
employer-club, all relative to the selection, retention and transfer
of the player services market. All were blatant per se violations of
antitrust laws. 135 But while preferable, the per se approach in
sports litigation will be seen less frequently than in the past 36
particularly with the increasing scope of collective bargaining and
the narrow confines 137 of per se applicability. Following this,
there is authority that even with the allegation of per se illegality,
unless an activity falls squarely within precedents set for per se
illegality, the activity may be evaluated according to some com-
promise between the per se approach and the rule of reason ap-
proach.' 38
135. Activities such as blacklisting, boycotting, exclusive division of territorial
markets, and exclusion of competitive leagues have all historically been used by
organized baseball without antitrust constraint. For an excellent discussion of
specific violative instances, see H.R. REP. No. 2002, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952), and
Comment, Monopsony in Manpower: Organized Baseball Meets the Antitrust
Laws, 62 YALE L.J. 576 (1953).
136. Successful per se arguments have been made in sports related litigation.
See, e.g., Washington State Bowling Prop. Ass'n. v. Pacific Lanes, Inc., 356 F.2d 371
(9th Cir. 1966); Smith v. Pro-Football, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 738 (D.D.C. 1976); Denver
Rockets v. All-Pro Management, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049 (C.D. Cal. 1971). In Smith,
the court invalidated the professional football draft, deeming it per se illegal, "a
group boycott in its classic and most pernicious form." 420 F. Supp. at 744. The
court pointed out also that there were "significantly less restrictive alternatives
available." Id. at 745. It must be closely noted that the draft invalidated in Smith
was not the subject of a collective bargaining agreement, such that the labor ex-
emption question would not apply. That would not be the case today. The subject
in Denver Rockets was the "4 year rule" in professional basketball, presumably
designed to foster and protect collegiate basketball. Athletic contracts could not
be entered into in professional basketball (here the NBA) until four years from
high school graduation. The rule was declared illegal per se as a group boycott,
proscribed by § 1 of the Sherman Act. 325 F. Supp. at 1067. On authority of Fash-
ion Originators Guild of America and Broadway-Hale Stores, see notes 132 and
133 supra, the rule was held illegal as an example of a group boycott conclusively
presumed illegal without inquiry into justification for its implementation.
137. Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963); Klors v. Broadway-
Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959); International Salt Co. v. United States, 332
U.S. 393 (1947); Fashion Originators Guild of Am., Inc. v. F.T.C., 312 U.S. 457 (1941);
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940); Chicago Bd. of Trade
v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918); Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States,
532 F.2d 615 (8th Cir. 1976); Cowen v. New York Stock Exch., 256 F. Supp. 462
(N.D.N.Y. 1966), aff'd, 371 F.2d 661 (2d Cir. 1967).
138. Comment, Player Control Mechanisms in Professional Team Sports, 34 U.
PrTT. L. REV. 645 (1973); The Super Bowl and the Sherman Act: Professional Team
Sports and the Antitrust Laws, 81 HARv. L. REV. 418, 423-24 (1967); see also Silver
v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963); Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United
States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918); Cowen v. New York Stock Exch., 256 F. Supp. 462
(N.D.N.Y. 1966), aff'd, 371 F.2d 661 (2d Cir. 1967). Sports cases in particular have
One may find, and must be prepared for, the imposition of a va-
riety of compromise in a case that seemingly involves per se ille-
gality. This compromise in a reserve system challenge would
involve a balancing of the particular restraint, its effect upon the
players interest in their freedom to contract and competitive free-
dom, and the factual inquiry into any special circumstances tend-
ing to justify the imposition of the restraint.139 Although it seems
to be a kind of rule of reason test in and of itself, this test is less
rigorous than the traditional one.
It is interesting to note the courts' willingness to allow limited
evidence tending to justify restrictive agreements in a seemingly
per se case when the purposes of the restraints have been non-
commercial.140 Justification of baseball's reserve system has, in
fact, been primarily non-commercial. This is not to say, however,
that it is completely non-economic. There are both economic in-
fluences, which include rising salaries, club financial existence
and league balance, and non-economic influences, such as the in-
tegrity of the sport. For example, the forcing out of competitive
leagues by the reserve rules, although not at issue today, comes
within the commercial purpose. It is suggested, therefore, that
even a per se case will be evaluated, to some extent, by a reasona-
bleness standard in a reserve rule challenge.
If an activity does not constitute that kind of conduct deemed
illegal per se, the courts will apply the rule of reason standard
which, necessarily entailing exceptionally difficult burdens likely
to involve expensive and lengthy litigation, requires the court to:
[C]onsider the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is ap-
plied; its condition before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature
of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable. The history of the re-
straint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular
remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant
facts. 1 4 1
Under this rule of reason approach, if management can show an
engendered controversy as to whether a per se illegality will be applied to player
restraint mechanisms. The view that unless such restraints are so wholly perni-
cious and so wholly one-sided that the summary per se approach is the only
proper rule, the rule of reason or some modification theory is the proper standard.
Chicago Board of Trade is one case among others that precludes the imposition of
the illegal per se framework whenever the collective regulations of an organized
market structure are involved.
139. Comment, Player Control Mechanisms in Professional Team Sports, 34 U.
Prrr. L. REV. 645, 654-55 (1973).
140. Id. Particular attention is paid to this theory in Comment, Player Control
Mechanisms in Professional Team Sports, 34 U. Prmr. L REv. 645, 656-60 (1973) (cit-
ing Coons, Non-Commercial Purpose As A Sherman Act Defense, 56 N.W.U.L. REV.
705 (1962)).
141. Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1968).
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overriding economic justification for a restrictive agreement then
it will be upheld as reasonable.
Valid justifications for player restraints deal with the sports in-
dustry as being unique in the field of antitrust. Unlike general in-
dustry, team and league competitors compete by agreement. This
creates the competitive balance with an element of continuity
whereby every team has a reasonable chance of success in a
given season-elements necessary for customer patronage and
financial success. The burden placed upon baseball plaintiffs in a
player restraint case to be evaluated under the rule of reason test
seems onerous. Given the premise that restraint mechanisms
have been upheld in greater as well as lesser degrees due to the
justifications presented in light of the unique business relation-
ships in the sports industry, challenge to player mobility restric-
tions may be particularly less successful than other challenges
based upon management antitrust violations.
The 1976 agreement providing for a reserve rule, momentarily
ignoring the labor exemption, would probably survive under the
rule of reason due to the allowance of the courts examination into
justification for anticompetitive effects of mobility restraints. The
court would require that the reserve period, which is presently six
years, genuinely support the league's justifiable interests in main-
taining balanced league competition and non-commercial pur-
poses, such as integrity, with the least amount of anticompetitive
potential. To date there has been little substantive argument with
the reserve system as it stands from the viewpoint of player-em-
ployees. Because the ends sought are being achieved with the
present system, alterations made upon it would only be upheld
where they promoted lesser restrictive potential, and not more.
Hindsight being what it is, the 1976 agreement would likely sur-
vive a rule of reason test. The reason? It has worked. But as to
what the future holds for the system, again ignoring the labor ex-
emption, will depend upon the alterations in the restrictions and
will fall to antitrust if too extreme and too anticompetitive in ac-
complishing the necessary balance of competition.142 It is sug-
142. The club owners seek to modify the existing rules relating to reserve and
free agency by imposing a system of compensation. The justification advanced for
the greater restrictiveness of their proposal deals with the correlative spiraling of
salary demands due to the present free agency system. The owners contend that
this system upsets the balance of competition by leaving the wealthiest teams
with the "best" players, contributes to the financial demise of poorer clubs, and
raises consumer prices which, in return, diminishes public confidence in the sport.
gested that any changes in the reserve system as it stands which
impose greater restrictions on player mobility and the ability to
market his skills would be particularly suspect, as the courts have
favored the imposition of provisions with the least amount of re-
strictive or anticompetitive effect necessary to achieve the justifia-
ble ends in a rule of reason analysis.
It has been seen that even assuming the applicability of the an-
titrust laws to organized baseball, the road to modifying total
management control of player mobility is not clear. The reserve
rules as they existed before the Messersmith-McNally arbitration
would probably have been susceptible to even an illegal per se ar-
gument, although this is not the case today. Not only have the re-
serve rules gone through a complete change in their
implementation and effect, the process has been submitted to col-
lective bargaining, which gives rise to the labor exemption. Nev-
ertheless, although the justifications for player restraint
mechanisms limit the success of an attack upon it based upon an-
titrust principles, it is important to understand the substantive
antitrust standards in light of other antitrust challenges that may
surface once the exemption is dissolved.
B. The Labor Exemption
The only major factor limiting the application of antitrust prin-
ciples to professional baseball's virtual monopoly is the labor ex-
emption to the antitrust laws. According to some authorities the
labor exemption means the demise of antitrust litigation in pro-
fessional sports.143 But as will be seen below, the labor exemp-
tion does not render antitrust dead and buried as applied against
monopolistic practices in professional athletics today. It should
be noted that antitrust could have special meaning in regards to
the forthcoming free agency negotiations, making the need for the
abolition of the antitrust exemption all the more immediate.
Response to the arbitrary denial of legislative protection led
baseball players to organize in order to avail themselves of the
right to bargain collectively. Although a particularly important
step in the development of baseball in improving the terms and
Facts seem to belie, in part, these so-called justifications. Public attendance is at
an all-time high, and the teams spending the most dollars on free agents have not
uniformly left them at the top of the heap in the final standings. See Staudohar,
Player Salary Issues in Major League Baseball, 33 ARB. J. 17 (1978). Although es-
calating salaries are a genuine concern, it should be noted that free agency has
only functioned as a vehicle by which greater bargaining power is reached. The
solution effectively lies not in further restriction of player mobility, but rather in
owner control of their individual pocketbooks.
143. See note 127 supra and accompanying text.
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conditions of its player-employees, the entrance into the collec-
tive bargaining arena triggers the right to engage in some prac-
tices which will escape sanctions imposed by antitrust. Congress
has seen fit to allow collective bargaining a shelter under which,
subject to certain criteria, antitrust will not apply to otherwise
monopolistic practices.
A combination of provisions of the Clayton Act,144 the Norris-
LaGuardia Act,145 the National Labor Relations Act, and deci-
sional law 146 compromise this "labor exemption" to the antitrust
laws. In the face of the present management position on the in-
tolerability of the system as it stands, an inquiry should well be
made into the limits of the labor exemption, for the future may
hold in store a new reserve system that has not been the subject
of meaningful collective bargaining.
The labor exemption is not applied automatically to agreements
solely because they fall under the rubric of collective bargaining.
Judicial interpretations compromise the criteria by which the la-
bor exemption comes into effect.
Initially, although of least import to the present reserve chal-
lenge, there can be no evidence that a union is combining with
non-labor groups to produce an external market effect, that is, to
eliminate competition by non-consenting entities.147 More impor-
tant to present discussion is the requirement that the union act in
its own self interest. 48 This may ideologically be tied with the
duty of fair representation. The union must represent the inter-
ests of all of its members, which in the case of professional sports
is not as easily accomplished as it would seem on its face. Espe-
cially with respect to a reserve system challenge in which the de-
144. 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1976); 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1976).
145. 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1976).
146. Amalgamated Meat Cutters Local 189 v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676 (1965);
United Mineworkers of America v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); Allen Bradley
Co. v. Electrical Workers Local 3, 325 U.S. 797 (1945); United States v. Hutcheson,
312 U.S. 219 (1941); Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921).
147. Allen Bradley Co. v. Electrical Workers Local 3, 325 U.S. 797 (1945). Allen
Bradley involved a closed shop agreement between electrical contractors and
manufacturers which had the effect of restricting the market area products to that
of the union only. Suit was brought by a nonsignatory manufacturer who was un-
able to market his product in the area due to the agreement. It was held that Con-
gress had not intended that violations of antitrust should be protected merely
because unions were involved, acting in concert with nonlabor to create a market
monopoly.
148. United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941).
gree of restrictiveness may be traded off to gain concessions in
other areas to balance its duty of fair representation. 149
That the reserve system is a mandatory subject of collective
bargaining has been established.150 But because a subject is
mandatory, does not automatically exempt it from antitrust scru-
tiny.'51 Because there is no clear cut policy indicating that inter-
nal labor effects as well as external market effects preclude the
immunization of an agreement from antitrust, it has been sug-
gested by some that, by implication, agreements which relate to
mandatory subject matter which have no external market effects
are not affected by the limitations imposed upon the labor exemp-
tion. 52 The internal-external effects that are distinctions in deci-
sional law should not be used to assert that only external effects
may result in antitrust liability. To do that requires reading
seemingly conflicting opinions'5 3 with blinders. That an "agree-
ment" is related to mandatory subjects does not mean antitrust li-
ability may be excluded with impunity. Laws drawn to protect
those who challenge an "agreement" may not be arbitrarily de-
nied to those who challenge the provision solely because it is a
mandatory subject under the rubric of collective bargaining.
"There are limits to what a union or an employer may offer or ex-
tract in the name of wages, and because they must bargain does
not mean that the agreement may disregard other laws."' 54 In ac-
cordance with this view, sports cases heretofore have adopted the
rationale that even upon finding that an agreement relates to a
mandatory subject of collective bargaining the court will not auto-
matically apply the exemption. 55
149. See discussion of the problems presented by the duty of fair representa-
tion in relation to the reserve system proposal infra n.167.
150. See note 102 supra.
151. UMW v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965). No labor exemption was available
to a union combination with management, which imposed a set wage scale to be
applied to nonconsenting management groups, and thereby had an external mar-
ket effect. Cf., Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., Inc., 381 U.S. 676
(1965). In Jewel Tea, there was no comparable external market effect against per-
sons outside the bargaining unit. A provision negotiated between the butcher's
union and member employers provided for an hour restriction on meat markets.
Under duress, Jewel Tea Stores signed the agreement, but brought suit against
the union seeking to have the restriction declared illegal, as violative of the anti-
trust laws. The Supreme Court refused to apply the antitrust laws, claiming the
labor exemption controlled. However, the opinions were diffuse. See note 153 in-
fra and accompanying text.
152. J. Weistart & C. Lowell, THE LAw OF SPORTS 556 (1979).
153. In fact, the Court in Jewel Tea gave two inconsistent reasons for its exter-
nal-internal distinction in its decision. In addition, three Justices dissented and
would have ruled in favor of the Jewel Tea stores.
154. United Mineworkers of America v. Pennington, 381 U.S. at 665.
155. Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976); Smith v.
Pro-Football, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 738 (D.D.C. 1976); Philadelphia World Hockey Club,
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At that point the courts will inquire as to the ultimate, and per-
haps most relevant consideration here: was the agreement a
product of "serious, intensive, arms-length collective bargain-
ing.' 5 6 The presence of genuine arms-length bargaining has re-
mained the one constant standard in the somewhat problematic
interpretations in sports cases involving the labor exemption. 15 7
The factors enumerated above indicate the criteria which must
be met to activate the imposition of the labor exemption. Lacking
the proper combination subjects an agreement to scrutiny under
the antitrust laws. This is where the antitrust principles will have
their life in baseball. While granting the immunity for the players
association to collectively bargain for provisions which may have
impermissible antitrust effects, the antitrust laws may keep a
watchful eye that true bargaining has occurred during negotia-
tions. In light of the posture that club ownership has recently
taken with regard to the reserve system, their "take-it-or-leave-it"
proposal raises serious doubts as to the system's propriety under
the antitrust laws. It is because of this kind of stand that base-
ball's antitrust exemption must be eliminated. While the labor
laws may stand in the forefront in future litigation, replacing the
impact antitrust once had, antitrust is nevertheless alive and well,
Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, 351 F. Supp. 462 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Robertson v. Na-
tional Basketball Ass'n, 389 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). The Mackey court re-
fused to apply the labor exemption in the face of an antitrust challenge to
football's Rozelle Rule on the basis of a lack of true arms-length collective bargain-
ing on the subject. 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976).
Although the court in Smith found that no collective bargaining agreement was
in force when the challenged draft was held, the court, in dicta, did suggest that
the college draft would be a mandatory subject of bargaining. An inquiry would
be proper to determine whether true collective bargaining had taken place. 420 F.
Supp. at 742. Robertson was in accord, Judge Carter holding that "[tihere is no
operative labor exemption barring or protecting the [National Basketball Associa-
tion and American Basketball Association] from being sued for antitrust viola-
tions." 389 F. Supp. at 884.
156. 351 F. Supp. at 499.
157. Robertson v. National Basketball Ass'n, 389 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)
(additionally denying the use of the labor exemption to protect employer defend-
ants from antitrust suits); Kapp v. National Football League, 390 F. Supp. 73 (N.D.
Cal. 1974) (suggesting that even if collective bargaining is present, apart from anti-
trust, unreasonable restrictions on employee rights to seek employment are unen-
forceable); Mackey v. National Football League, 407 F. Supp. 1000 (D. Minn. 1975),
modified, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976) (suggesting that the availability of the ex-
emption requires also that alleged restraint primarily affects only the collective
bargaining parties and that the restraint involves a matter which is a mandatory
subject of collective bargaining). See generally J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, THE LAW
OF SPORTS, 568-90 (1979).
providing the necessary link in a system which assures arms-
length negotiation and fair competition in the marketplace for
professional athletic talent.
V. BASEBALL TODAY
A. Impasse in 1980
The 1976 Basic Agreement terminated on December 31, 1979.
Negotiations for a new basic agreement have been far froln tran-
quil. Months of parleying reaped only wide differences. The key
confrontation between the players association and the club own-
ers is again the baseball reserve system.
In the spring of 1980, the players association appeared to con-
cede the status quo of the reserve system as it stood at the expi-
ration of the 1976 Basic Agreement,158 proposing only that the six
year eligibility be reduced to five years.159 In a unique turn of
events, it is the club owners who were the mavericks this year.
They proposed that when a free agent is signed by any of the
twenty-six major league teams, the club he leaves has a limited
right to select a quality player from the team that signed the free
agent. Under these particular terms, a team may exempt fifteen
of twenty-five of their roster players, leaving ten players subject
to claim by the club which the free agent left. The owners claim
that compensation for the loss of a free agent is only fair'6 0 to rec-
ompense a team for the time, money, and effort expended in
training the player as well as for the talent they lose by the
player becoming a free agent. But in reality the reasoning behind
their posture goes further than that. Forcing free agency to a vir-
tual halt for most baseball players, excepting so-called "super-
stars," will be the result of this deflation of the free agent market.
The owners served notice, however, that the reserve system is
unacceptable as it stands and that they were prepared to with-
stand a long strike in order to get it modified. 16 1 The players asso-
ciation was no less adamant. But it should be noted too that
158. See appendix infra.
159. The five year proposal is a concession from the original four year proposal.
160. The reasoning for the owners' scheme, a baseball adaptation of the Rozelle
Rule, is poor indeed. Limited only by the inopposite standards of draft selections
the freeze of 15 players would cover only a starting field and the pitching rotation,
leaving the bullpen and backups (the 10 remaining players) open to be snatched
by a club losing a player to free agency. This not only would effectively stop a
team from contracting with a free agent, it would leave 10 men on every team liv-
ing with the likelihood that they would lose all prospect of playing out their option
and seeking another club to play for and the chance for better pay. It all but stops
free agency cold. The word "fair" is not quite appropriate here.
161. The owners were reported to have taken out an approximately 50 million
dollar insurance policy to indemnify themselves in case of a strike.
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unions, while amenable to concession, have rarely been found to
accept such a sweeping retreat of an employment condition in the
negotiation process. In fact, with regard to the present reserve
system, some association members have accused the association
negotiators of "selling out" with respect to the six year eligibility
requirement negotiated in 1976. This may serve to indicate the
kind of stance that the players association will take in the face of
the owners' demands for modification.
During the 1980 spring training, players voted with but a single
dissent, to authorize a strike should an agreement not be reached.
They did, in fact, close out spring training a week early. The sea-
son commenced on schedule, however, but a new strike deadline
was set for midnight on May 22, 1980, if no agreement was
reached.
Negotiation was at an impasse from the start of the 1980 season
up to and throughout the May 22nd deadline. The public, media,
and players alike162 seemed to accede to the fact that a strike was
inevitable. Yet, as unanticipated as the Mets of 1969 and snow in
June, a strike was narrowly averted by baseball management and
player representatives just before dawn on May 23, 1980. A kin-
ship between cat and mouse? Not exactly. Although settlement
was not reached, an agreement was made for an arrangement that
deferred further settlement of the reserve system controversy un-
til January of 1981. Other issues were reconciled, however, in-
cluding among them, pension contributions and minimum salary
requirements. 163
Critical to the avoidance of a strike was the disposition of the
free agent compensation issue. The agreement reached author-
ized a committee of two player representatives and two manage-
ment representatives to meet no later than August 1st, to study
the free agent system and submit reports no later than January 1,
1981. If the committee agrees on a replacement for Article XVII of
the 1976 Basic Agreement, it will become part of the 1980 Basic
162. Reporters from coast to coast confirmed the likelihood of a strike. From
the early close of spring training, newspapers across the country filled their sports
pages with "strike stories." As well, a sign adorned the Los Angeles clubhouse
"Gone Fishin."
163. Other negotiations involved the owners agreement to a $15.5 million an-
nual pension plan contribution from their original offer of $14.4 million. The own-
ers accepted the player proposal for minimum salary levels of $30,000 in 1980 and
$32,500 in 1982 and the players accepted the owners' offer of $33,500 in 1983 and
$35,000 in 1984.
Agreement. But, if the committee is not in agreement as to the
terms of the new article then, (1) management has the right to
unilaterally implement their compensation proposal or a variation
thereof, "not less favorable" to player-employees, between Febru-
ary 15th and 20th; and (2) the players association, by giving notice
by March 1st, have the right to strike by June 1, 1981 over the im-
passe in the free agency negotiations. The single limitation on the
players association's right to call a strike is the fact that should
they decide not to strike at the prescribed time, they will lose
their right to strike for the balance of the agreement. 16 4
The deferment of the reserve system issue may be seen as a
victory of sorts for the young players association. They stood fast
to their commitment to strike and, barely hours before the first
game of the day was scheduled, the owners agreed to a proposal
which they had unilaterally rejected only a week earlier. The un-
expected move sent ballplayers, who had shut off their alarms for
the morning of May 23rd, scuttling for flights to their road destina-
tions. Baseball was on for 1980.
B. Labor Pains in '81?
The year 1981, may find baseball either reconciling its differ-
ences at the collective bargaining table, or as a ghostly presence
in silent ballparks across the country. The ambit of collective bar-
gaining includes within it both the "right" of employee strikes as
well as management lockouts.165 The use of a strike as a weapon
of economic warfare in collective bargaining is well established.
The usual case in a strike, however, is that employees refuse to
work as a means to coerce their employer into acceding to a de-
mand which has been refused. Nevertheless, it is here that man-
agement has made the demand, and the players in refusing to
bargain away rights they have heretofore enjoyed with no accom-
panying concession, seek to use a strike in defense.
Yet the right to strike is not without limitation. Both parties
are still under the obligation to bargain in good faith. A potential
challenge that the players association may lodge against the own-
ers is a lack of good faith bargaining, constituting an unfair labor
164. The right to strike may be waived, however, with reinstatement of the
right by club permission in 1982. As this article goes to print, the major league
club owners have exercised their right to unilaterally implement their compensa-
tion proposal, suggesting that negotiations are at a virtual standstill as baseball
opens its 1981 spring training camp. Marvin Miller of the players association has
charged the owners with bad faith refusal to bargain. Owner George Steinbrenner
recently indicated that the owners are "more ready than ever" to withstand a
strike. Baseball has a rough road to travel in 1981.
165. For in-depth effects of strikes and lockouts in professional sports see J.
Weistart & C. Lowell, THE LAW OF SPORTS 823 (1979).
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practice. Bad faith may have been found in management's earlier
stance in issuing an adamant "take-it-or-leave-it" proposal,166 and
very well could be found if in 1981, they take the same stance.
Other problems are inherent in any decision to effect a work
stoppage. The owners may have already formented dissent
within the ranks of the players association which may ultimately
erode its web of support for a strike. Any strike would most cer-
tainly affect the life of a player on the low end of the salary scale
more devastatingly than so-called "superstars" and those players
with a number of years of major league service under their belts.
The charge of the owners that the players association has refused
to trade off proposals aimed at benefiting the newer and lower
paid players, with a modification of the reserve system, thus forc-
ing a strike to the greater detriment of those players, may create
dissention within the ranks of the association. Charges of a viola-
tion of the association's duty of fair representation 67 may follow,
doing great damage to the solidarity of its bargaining position
with the owners.
Throughout the spring of 1980, the owners conducted a media
blitz engendering the majority of the public who expressed an
opinion on the issue to side with the "poor owners," who were
presented as being backed against a wall by a gang of bat-wield-
ing brutes. 68
The public interest is an important element in labor disputes
involving professional athletics. This public interest is itself re-
flected in a general manner, in the principles of the National La-
bor Relations Act.169 It is also reflected in the congressional
hearings on the subject of professional sports. And Judge Cooper,
in his district court opinion in Flood v. Kuhn,170 even felt com-
pelled to take judicial notice that "baseball is everybody's busi-
ness."171
166. See General Elec. Co., 150 N.L.R.B. 192 (1964), enforced, 418 F.2d 736 (2d
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 965 (1970). This bargaining technique is frequently
referred to as "boulwarism," named after its apparent founder at General Electric.
J. Weistart & C. Lowell, THE LAW OF SPORTS 804 n.208 (1979).
167. See generally the collective bargaining section supra.
168. Informal survey of those responding to the Los Angeles Times and New
York Times "letters to the editor" found support for management four to one. It
was indicated, however, that the public was largely uninformed and misled early
on as to actual work stoppage issues.
169. J. Weistart & C. Lowell, THE LAW OF SPORTs 837 (1979).
170. 309 F. Supp. 793 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
171. Id. at 797.
The players, on the other hand, have not been particularly effec-
tive in rousing public support. Labor negotiations in the area of
professional athletics are conducted in a fishbowl. The associa-
tion would be wise to pay more attention to its public relations
lest the owners continue their blitz on the public in 1981, further
skewing association support.
The spectre of a baseball strike looms ominously in the near fu-
ture. The hub of the dispute is the reserve system; nevertheless,
management concedes that rising payrolls are the real concern. A
viable method of control is sought as the means to the end of rap-
idly escalating salaries. But the element of control should be ex-
ercised among the owners themselves. Salary demands are not
among the issues that will bring baseball to a strike. The reserve
free agent system, on paper, has nothing to do with salaries. It
has to do with mobility. If salary rates are grossly inflated then
we must look to the ones who sign the checks. Unfortunately, the
club owners stab each other in the back in the fall and cry pov-
erty in the spring.172
A strike is not an answer. At best it is a tactic. Circumstances
point to the fact that if club owners are truly prepared to weather
a strike, the losers will be the ballplayers. Thus, if the players as-
sociation cannot obtain leverage to come to an agreement with
the owners, whether by direct challenge to their stance that the
reserve system is intolerable as it exists, or a concession based
upon the leverage to wield antitrust power in other areas, there is
a sad likelihood that along with a prolonged strike will come the
financial devastation of hundreds of young men, as well as a po-
tentially fatal blow to the Major League Baseball Players Associa-
tion. The vast progress that ballplayers have made in the process
of collective bargaining may be defeated by the very ills that
plagued baseball from its early days.
VI. ANTITRUST AND LABOR-A PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE IN
BASEBALL'S FUTURE
There is an oddly balanced set of interrelationships between
the antitrust laws and the labor laws. The imposition of one,
172. Free agency may have spawned large salaries yet the market should adjust
itself when the results are in. Owners may then perhaps control their pocket-
books rather than attack the system.
It is too early to determine whether free agents with seven figure con-
tracts will perform well enough to give the club owners a return on their
investments since many free agent contracts have several years to run.
Although free agents have played well, a majority of them have not pro.
vided the box office rewards that the owners expected.
Staudohar, Players Salary Issues in Major League Baseball, 33 ARB. J. 17, 19
(1978).
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however, will not necessarily supercede, in total, the imposition of
the other. In support, the Supreme Court has stated that, "bene-
fits to organized labor cannot be utilized as a cat's-paw to pull em-
ployers' chestnuts out of the antitrust fires." 7 3 Nevertheless, the
very nature of the collective bargaining agreement mandates that
the parties be able to "restrain" trade to a greater degree than
management could do unilaterally. 7 4 It is suggested that there
must be an examination of the purposes and competing interests
of labor and antitrust statutes for the purpose of striking a bal-
ance.17 5 There would be a limit to the antitrust violations to
which the players and club and league management can agree.
If the club owners present the players association with a take-
it-or-leave-it proposal as to changes in the reserve system consti-
tuting mandatory compensation for the loss of free agents, it
would not be subject to the labor exemption should the antitrust
laws apply.' 76 Assuming that the labor exemption would not pro-
tect the agreement, it is dubious at best whether or not a form of
compensation would be deemed reasonable under antitrust stan-
dards.' 77 Unless club ownership could demonstrate that the pre-
viously negotiated system fostered vastly negative effects upon
the justifications offered to uphold the restrictive practices, the
courts will most likely find the promulgated restraints too exten-
sive and thus violative of the antitrust laws. The judicial system
seeks to posit the least restrictive systems necessary to achieve
justifiable goals. A take-it-or-leave-it proposal imposed unilater-
ally by club ownership would have no effect under the protection
of the antitrust laws. Without the present antitrust laws, redress
may only be had through the National Labor Relations Board.
History has dictated that only by resort to the Congress will the
anomaly that baseball's antitrust exemption rests upon be eradi-
cated. Placing baseball on a par with other sports, thus subjecting
management to operate under the purview of antitrust laws,
would allow ballplayers to obtain the leverage they need at the
bargaining table. With respect to an impending strike, the players
association needs leverage now. While the elimination of the ex-
emption would not per se assure a solution to the players' di-
173. United States v. Women's Sportswear Mfrs. Ass'n, 336 U.S. 460, 464 (1949).
174. 407 U.S. at 295 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
175. Id.
176. See Zoller, From Gridiron to the Courtroom, 17 AM. Bus. J. 135 (1979).
177. See Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976).
lemma in face of the owners' demands today, it would afford them
a stronger position in negotiation, and allow for increases in bar-
gaining power. It could also serve to bind the membership
tighter, despite attempts to splinter their unity.
It is certainly unlikely and unnecessary that baseball destroy it-
self.178 Collective bargaining has shown itself to be a workable
entity in baseball. It is important that management and labor
come to a mutual compromise in the spirit of true bargaining for
the benefit of the workers and the sport alike. The owners must
not be allowed to unilaterally impose their compensation proposal
because they are better able to withstand a strike. As Justice
Douglas has opined, "It]he owners, whose records many say re-
veal a proclivity for predatory practice, do not come to us with eq-
uities."179 We may likely see a baseball strike in 1981 over the
compensation issue. If the collective element of collective bar-
gaining breaks down, then players are either forced to accept
management's proposal or enter into economic warfare that may
destroy careers, the players association, and perhaps baseball it-
self. It is hoped that the above examination of the past and sug-
gestions for the future may emasculate these dire predictions.
For above all, it is true that:
Baseball . . . enjoys a unique plane in our American heritage . . . [it] is
avidly followed by millions of fans, looked upon with fervor and pride and
provides a special source of inspiration ... especially for the young....
To put it mildly and with restraint, it would be unfortunate indeed if a fine
sport and profession, which brings surcease from daily travail and escape
from the ordinary to most inhabitants of this land, were to suffer in the
least because of undue concentration by any one or any group on com-
mercial and profit considerations. The game is on higher ground; it be-
178. Predictions of doom are not new. After Gardella, a former minor league
baseball official, Florida Congressman Syd Herlong, made a speech on the floor of
the House of Representatives lamenting that the Gardella case would "sound the
death knell for the sport that has kindled the fires of ambition in the breasts of so
many thousands of young Americans." (quoted in L SOBEL, PROFESSIONAL
SPORTS AND THE LAW 15 (1977)).
179. 407 U.S. at 287 (Douglas, J., dissenting). This is somewhat of an under-
statement. Players Association figures represent that only 27.2% of the club own-
ers income goes to payroll which is in stark contrast to the 50% figure of most
other industries. This does not include parking, concessions and other revenue
sources of which the club owners are not required to submit. Add the fact that
many clubs are rapidly taking control of, or sharing in, the profits of concessions
and parking and this represents a trend that will continue. Most persuasive, how-
ever, is the potential explosion of profit with the advent of pay cable television.
The potential is limitless. Thus, the owners are not financially strapped. And if
some may be, they must convince their brethren to exercise some restraint. To
force the players to pay for the owners' lack of self-control is the epitome of ineq-
uity.
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hooves everyone to keep it there.1 80
NANcY JEAN MEISSNER
180. 309 F. Supp. at 797.
ARTICLE XVII-RESERVE SYSTEM
A. Reservation Rights of Clubs
Subject to the rights of Players as set forth in this Agreement,
each Club may have title to and reserve up to 40 Player contracts.
A Club shall retain title to a contract and reservation rights until
one of the following occurs:
(1) The Player becomes a free agent, as set forth in this Ar-
ticle;
(2) The Player becomes a free agent as a result of
(a) termination of the contract by the Club pursuant to
paragraph 7(b) thereof,
(b) termination of the contract by the Player pursuant to
paragraph 7(a) thereof,
(c) failure by the Club to tender to the Player a new con-
tract within the time period specified in paragraph 10(a) of
the contract, or
(d) failure by the Club to exercise its right to renew the
contract within the time period specified in paragraph 10(a)
thereof; or
(3) The contract is assigned outright by the Club.
A Club may also reserve, under separate headings on a Reserve
List, Players who properly have been placed on the Voluntarily
Retired List, the Military List, the Suspended List, the Restricted
List, the Disqualified List or the Ineligible List. (See also Attach-
ments 12, 13 and 14).
B. Free Agency
(1) Player Contracts Executed Prior to August 9, 1976. Fol-
lowing completion of the term of the contract as set forth
therein, the Club may renew the contract, as specified pursuant
to paragraph 10(a) thereof, for one additional year. The Player,
unless he has executed a contract for the next succeeding sea-
son, shall become a free agent on the day following the last
game played by the Club (in the championship season, or in the
League Championship Series or the World Series if the Club
participates in such Series) in the renewal year, subject to the
provisions of Section C below.
(2) Player Contracts Executed On or After August 9, 1976.
Following completion of the term of the contract as set forth
therein, any Player with 6 or more years of Major League serv-
"All Rights Reserved"-Major Leagues Baseball Players Association 1976-
Reprinted from 1976 Basic Agreements
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ice who has not executed a contract for the next succeeding
season shall become a free agent, subject to the provisions of
Section C below, by giving notice as hereinafter provided within
the 15 day period beginning on October 15 (or the day following
the last game of the World Series, whichever is later). Election
of free agency shall be communicated by telephone or any
other method of communication by the Player to the Players
Association. Written notice of free agency shall then be given
within the specified time limits by the Players Association, on
behalf of the Player, to a designated representative of the
Player Relations Committee, and shall become effective upon
receipt.
C. Reentry Procedure
The procedure set forth in this Section C shall apply to Players
who become free agents pursuant to Section B above. Players
who otherwise become free agents under this Agreement shall be
eligible to negotiate and contract with any Club without any re-
strictions or qualifications, shall be deemed not to have exercised
rights of free agency for purposes of Section E of this Article
XVII, and the Clubs signing such free agents shall do so without
regard to the quota and compensation provisions of this Article.
(1) Negotiation Rights Selection Procedure
(a) A Selection Meeting of the Major League Clubs shall
be convened by the Commissioner during the period between
November 1 and November 15 of each year for the Clubs to
select rights to negotiate and contract with free agent Players.
Such Players shall be listed on an "Eligible List" certified by
the League Presidents and the Players Association. Selec-
tions shall be made from the Eligible List.
(b) At the Selection Meeting, Clubs shall select in inverse
order of their standing in the championship season just con-
cluded. Percentage of games won and lost shall determine
the order within each League without respect to Divisions. If
two or more Clubs within a League have the same percent-
age, the order of selection among such Clubs shall be deter-
mined by lot. In 1976, the League drafting first shall be
determined by lot and Leagues shall alternate choices there-
after. In succeeding years, the League which selected second
in the previous year shall select first.
(c) Each of the 24 (26 beginning in 1977) participating Ma-
jor League Clubs may make one selection in each round. As
the proceedings advance, round by round, each Player may
be selected by a maximum of 12 Clubs (13 beginning in 1977),
not counting the Player's former Club which need not select
such a Player. The selections will continue until each eligible
Player has been selected by 12 Clubs (13 beginning in 1977)
or until each Club has indicated that it desires to make no
further selections. At the conclusion of the selections, the for-
mer Club of each Player will be asked to indicate whether it
wishes to have negotiation rights with respect to that Player,
and, if it does desire to have such rights, it will then be added
to the list of Clubs eligible to negotiate and contract with that
Player.
(d) If less than 2 Clubs select negotiation rights to a par-
ticular Player, the Player immediately will be free to negoti-
ate and contract with any Major League Club, without
restrictions or qualifications applicable to either the Player or
the Club, in the same manner as a Player who becomes a free
agent other than by virtue of Section B above.
(e) Any Player who, under these procedures, is unsigned
on February 15 may elect, within 7 days after that date, to re-
submit himself to a new drawing of lots by the Clubs for the
selection of negotiating rights with him. The new drawing
shall be held within 3 days after communication of the
Player's election. Negotiating rights shall be granted to 4
Clubs determined by lot from Clubs which indicate at the
time of the drawing that they are interested in signing such
Player. The Player's former Club shall not be eligible to ac-
quire negotiating rights pursuant to this paragraph. Of the 4
Clubs so determined, 2 shall be from each League, except, in
the event less than 2 Clubs from one League indicate interest,
more than 2 Clubs may be determined from the other League
in order that a total of 4 Clubs are determined. If a Player
elects to invoke the optional procedure provided for in this
paragraph, all prior negotiation rights shall be cancelled and
only the 4 Clubs drawn by lot would then have negotiation
rights with the Player. Any such Club may sign the Player
without regard to the quota provisions of this Article. If less
than 2 Clubs select negotiation rights to a particular Player
under this optional procedure, paragraph (d) above shall ap-
ply.
(2) Contracting With Free Agents
(a) Regardless of the number of Players for whom they
have drafted negotiation rights, Clubs shall be limited in the
number they may subsequently sign to contracts. The
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number of signings permitted shall be related to the number
of Players on the Eligible List. If there are 14 or less players
on the Eligible List no Club may sign more than one Player.
If there are from 15 to 38 Players on the Eligible List, no Club
may sign more than 2 Players. If there are from 39 to 62 Play-
ers on the Eligible List, no Club may sign more than 3 Play-
ers. If there are more than 62 Players on the Eligible List, the
Club quotas shall be increased accordingly.
(b) Irrespective of the provisions of paragraph (a) above,
a Club shall be eligible to sign at least as many Players as it
may have lost through Players having become free agents at
the close of the season just concluded, under the provisions of
Section B of this Article.
(c) No Player shall be prevented from negotiating with
(and potentially signing with) at least 6 Clubs, or if less than
6 Clubs have selected negotiation rights with him, then the
number of Clubs that have selected negotiation rights with
him. Should the signing of other Players to contracts reduce
the number of Clubs (excluding the Player's former Club) eli-
gible to sign a particular Player below 6 (or below the number
of Clubs drafting him if less than 6), then the Commissioner
shall make an additional Club(s) eligible to sign such Player.
The additional Club(s) shall be determined by lot from Clubs
(excluding the Player's former Club) which
(1) originally drafted negotiation rights with the Player
but became ineligible to sign the Player because of ex-
hausting the limit of Player signings permitted under
paragraphs (a) and (b) above, and
(2) indicate at the time of drawing of lots that they con-
tinue to be interested in signing such Player.
If the above procedure fails to restore the number of Clubs el-
igible to sign the Player to 6 (or the number of Clubs drafting
him if less than 6), then the additional Clubs shall be deter-
mined by lot from all the remaining Clubs (excluding the
'Player's former Club) which, at the time of drawing, indicate
interest in signing the Player, in order to so restore the
number of Clubs. This procedure shall be followed and im-
plemented on a weekly basis (and on a more frequent basis
after January 1 of each year) to restore to the Player the min-
imum number of Clubs required to be available to negotiate
(and potentially sign a contract) with him.
(d) When a Player and one of the Clubs which has se-
lected negotiation rights to him reach agreement on terms,
the Club will immediately notify its League Office of that fact
together with a summary of the terms to which the Player has
agreed. The Players Association will then be advised by the
League Office of these facts and will promptly seek confirma-
tion of them by the Player. Upon obtaining such confirma-
tion, the Players Association shall notify the League Office,
and all other Clubs holding negotiation rights to that Player
shall be advised that the Player has come to terms and is no
longer a free agent.
(c) A Club which signs a contract with a Player who be-
came a free agent pursuant to Section B(1) of this Article,
shall not compensate the Player's former Club. A Club which
signs a contract with a Player who became a free agent pursu-
ant to Section B(2) of this Article, shall, except as provided in
Section C(1) (d) above, and the last sentence of Section
C(1) (e) above, compensate the Player's former Club by as-
signing to it a draft choice in the Regular Phase of the next
June Major League Rule 4 Amateur Player Draft. If the sign-
ing Club is among the first half of selecting Clubs, then the
choice to be assigned for the most preferred free agent Player
signed by such Club shall be its second choice, with choices
in the next following rounds to be assigned as compensation
for the signing of other Players in descending order of prefer-
ence. If the signing Club is among the second half of select-
ing Clubs, then such compensation shall begin with the
Club's first choice. In determining the order of preference
among Players for this purpose, the Player selected by more
Clubs will rank higher and, if the number of selecting Clubs
is the same, the Player first selected by that number of Clubs
will rank higher.
(3) Conduct of Free Agents and Clubs Prior to Selection
Meeting
(a) During the period beginning on the day the Player be-
comes a free agent and ending 3 days before the Negotiation
Rights Selection Meeting, any Club representative and any
free agent or his representative may talk with each other and
discuss the merits of the free agent contracting, when eligible
therefor, with the Club, provided, however, that the Club and
the free agent shall not negotiate terms or contract with each
other. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the free agent and his
previous Club may engage in negotiations and enter into a
contract during said period. Should they enter into a contract
during said period, the free agent shall be deemed not to have
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exercised his rights of free agency for purposes of Section E
of this Article XVII, and the Club shall be deemed not to have
signed a free agent for purposes of the quota provisions of
this Article.
(b) During the period beginning 3 days before the Negoti-
ation Rights Selection Meeting and ending with the conclu-
sion of the Selection Meeting, free agents and Clubs may
continue discussion as set forth in paragraph (a) above, but
no terms shall be negotiated and no contracts shall be en-
tered into.
(4) Miscellaneous
(a) Any Club selecting negotiation to and signing a con-
tract with a Player under this Section C may not assign his
contract until after the next June 15. However, notwithstand-
ing the foregoing, such contract may be assigned for other
Player contracts and/or cash consideration of $50,000 or less
prior to the next June 16 if the Player gives written consent to
such transaction.
(b) If a maximum number of Clubs select negotiating
rights for a player who has become a free agent pursuant to
Section B and, subsequent to the Selection Meeting, the
Player does not contract with a Major League Club but does
contract with a National Association Club, such Player shall
not be eligible for assignment to or to contract with a Major
League Club until he has been subject to the draft of National
Association players, as provided for in Major League Rule 5,
following the next playing season.' If the Player is not se-
lected in such draft, a special Selection Meeting will be held
for him during the first week of the next January pursuant to
the procedures set forth in Section C.
(c) There shall be no restriction or interference with the
right of a free agent to negotiate or contract with any baseball
club outside the structure of organized baseball, nor shall
there be any compensation paid for the loss of a free agent
except as provided for in this Agreement.
o If less than a maximum number of Clubs have selected negotiating rights
for such a Player, the foregoing restriction on eligibility shall not apply, provided,
however, that such Player shall not be eligible for assignment to or to contract
with any Major League Club which has filled its quota for the signing of free
agents until he has been subject to the Major League Rule 5 draft.
D. Right to Require Assignment of Contract
(1) Eligibility. Any Player who signed a contract on or af-
ter August 9, 1976, and has 5 or more years of Major League
service, may elect, at the conclusion of a season, to require that
his contract be assigned to another Club. A Player who re-
quires the assignment of his contract pursuant to this Section D
shall not be entitled to receive a Moving Allowance. A Player
shall not be eligible to require the assignment of his contract if
his contract covers the next succeeding season, provided, how-
ever, that if his contract has been assigned by the Club which
originally executed it, the Player shall be eligible to require the
assignment of his contract notwithstanding the fact that it cov-
ers the next succeeding season. (See also Attachment 15).
(2) Procedure.
(a) Notice. A Player may exercise his right to require the
assignment of his contract by giving notice as hereinafter pro-
vided within the 15 day period beginning on October 15 (or
the day following the last game of the World Series, which-
ever is later). Election to require the assignment of his con-
tract shall be communicated by telephone or any other
method of communication by the Player to the Players Asso-
ciation. Written notice thereof shall then be given within the
specified time limits by the Players Association, on behalf of
the Player, to a designated representative of the Player Rela-
tions Committee, and shall become effective upon receipt.
(b) Player Veto Rights. At the time notice is given as pro-
vided in paragraph (a) above, the Player may also designate
not more than 6 Clubs which he will not accept as assignee of
his contract, and the Player's Club shall be bound to assign
his contract thereafter to a Club not on such list.
(c) Free Agency if Assignment Not Made. If the Player's
Club fails to assign his contract, as set forth in this Section D,
on or before March 15, the Player shall become a free agent
immediately eligible to negotiate and contract with any Club
without any restrictions or qualifications. The Player shall be
deemed not to have exercised his right of free agency or his
right to demand a trade, for purposes of Section E of this Ar-
ticle XVII, and the Club signing him shall do so without re-
gard to the quota and compensation provisions of this Article.
A Player who becomes a free agent pursuant to this para-
graph shall not be entitled to receive termination pay. Such a
free agent shall receive transportation and travel expenses in
the same manner as he would if he had been unconditionally
released except he shall be limited to receiving travel ex-
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penses to his new club if he reports to it directly, provided
such expenses are less than to his home city.
(3) Retraction by Player. A Player who has elected to exer-
cise his right to require an assignment of his contract may re-
tract such election on or before March 15, by sending a telegram
to his Club, provided that such telegram must be sent prior to
the time a telegram is sent to him by his Club notifying him
that his contract has been assigned. If such a Player has 10 or
more years of Major League service, the last 5 of which have
been with one Club, he shall, upon such retraction, be deemed
to relinquish his right to approve any assignment of his contract
to another Major League Club which is completed within 60
days after such retraction or until March 15, whichever is later.
A Player who retracts his election shall be deemed not to have
exercised his right to require an assignment for purposes of
Section E of this Article XVII.
E. Repeater Rights
(1) Free Agency. Any Player who becomes a free agent pur-
suant to Section B of this Article or whose contract was as-
signed as a result of a trade required pursuant to Section D of
this Article shall not subsequently be eligible to exercise his
right to become a free agent until he has completed an addi-
tional 5 years of Major League service.
(2) Trade Demand. Any Player who became a free agent
pursuant to Section B of this Article or whose contract was as-
signed as a result of a trade required pursuant to Section D of
this Article shall not subsequently be eligible to exercise his
right to require the assignment of his contract until he has com-
pleted an additional 3 years of Major League service.
F. Outright Assignment to National Association Club
(1) Election of Free Agency. Any Player who has at least 3
years of Major League service and whose contract is assigned
outright to a National Association Club may elect, in lieu of ac-
cepting such assignment, to become a free agent. A Player who
becomes a free agent under this Section F shall immediately be
eligible to negotiate and contract with any Club without any re-
strictions or qualifications. Such Player shall not be entitled to
receive termination pay. Such a free agent shall receive trans-
portation and travel expenses in the same manner as he would
if he had been unconditionally released except he shall be lim-
ited to receiving travel expenses to his new club if he reports to
it directly, provided such expenses are less than to his home
city.
(2) Procedure. Not earlier than 4 days prior to the contem-
plated date of an outright assignment, the Club shall give writ-
ten notice to the Player, with a copy to the Players Association,
which shall advise the Player that he may either (a) accept the
assignment or (b) elect to become a free agent. The Player
shall also be informed in the notice that, within 3 days after the
date of the notice, he must advise the Club in writing as to his
decision. If the Club fails to give written notice, as set forth
herein, to the Player prior to the date of such assignment, the
Player may, at any time, elect to become a free agent pursuant
to this Section F, provided, however, that if the Club subse-
quently gives such written notice to the Player, he shall, within
3 days thereafter, advise the Club in writing as to his decision.
G. Individual Nature of Rights
The utilization or non-utilization of rights under this Article XVII
is an individual matter to be determined solely by each Player
and each Club for his or its own benefit. Players shall not act in
concert with other Players and Clubs shall not act in concert with
other Clubs.
